



The history of employment law has witnessed a move from mandates di-
rected to workers as a whole, such as workers' compensation, to mandates di-
rected to particular, identifiable groups of workers, such as the reasonable ac-
commodation mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act. These newer
"accommodation mandates" are ordinarily analyzed using an economic
framework developed for mandates directed to workers as a whole. However,
this framework yields misleading and incorrect conclusions when applied to
accommodation mandates. This Article offers a new framework for analyzing
accommodation mandates. The framework generates testable predictions about
the effects of these mandates-predictions that are largely confirmed by the ex-
isting empirical evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal requirements that employers provide specified benefits to their
workers, such as workers' compensation and family leave, are virtually om-
nipresent in modem employment law. Some mandates are directed to work-
ers as a whole, and many of these date back to the early part of the twentieth
century (workers' compensation, for instance'). But other, newer mandates
are directed to discrete, identifiable groups of workers, such as the disabled.
These mandates are intended to accommodate the unique needs of those
workers. These "accommodation mandates," and their consequences for the
accommodated workers, are the central topics explored below.
Since accommodation mandates regulate a market relationship-that of
employer and employee-an important set of questions about them involves
how they affect the wages and employment levels of the accommodated
group. There is an accepted economic framework for analyzing the effects
of mandates directed to workers as a whole (such as workers' compensa-
tion),2 but accommodation mandates raise many distinct issues that have not
been adequately addressed in the existing literature. Central among these
issues is the way in which antidiscrimination law interacts with accommo-
dation mandates; this interaction is simply not relevant when analyzing man-
dates directed to workers as a whole. Antidiscrimination law attempts to
restrict differences in wages and employment levels between accommodated
and nonaccommodated groups, and these restrictions will fundamentally alter
how an accommodation mandate affects the wages and employment levels of
accommodated workers.
Part I below develops a general framework for analyzing the effects of
accommodation mandates. These mandates, perhaps most familiar from the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),3 dot the landscape of mod-
em employment law. Examples include:
a) The requirement under the ADA that employers provide "reasonable
accommodation" to disabled workers.4 This requirement accommodates the
special needs of disabled employees.
b) The requirement under some state laws that insurance companies-
and, as a result, employers who offer health insurance provided by these com-
panies-cover maternity-related hospital and medical expenses in their in-
1. See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation
in the United States, 1900-1930,41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 305 (1998).
2. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON.
REV., May 1989, Papers & Proceedings, at 177.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5) (1994).
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surance plans that provide general hospital and medical coverage.5 This re-
quirement accommodates the special needs of female employees of child-
bearing age, although it may also accommodate the needs of certain other
employees, as discussed more fully in Part II.B.l.a below.
c) The requirement under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA) that employers permit their employees to take unpaid leave in the
event that they have a "serious health condition."6 This requirement accom-
modates the special needs of disabled employees-who are more likely than
other employees to need to take time off because of such a condition-al-
though certain employees who are not disabled will also be accommodated
by the requirement.
d) The FMLA's requirement that employers permit their employees to
take unpaid leave in the event that they have a newborn or newly adopted
child or an immediate family member who is seriously ill.7 This requirement
accommodates the special needs of female employees of childbearing age,
although again it may also accommodate other needs and circumstances, as
discussed more fully in Part lI.C.l.a below.
All of these accommodation mandates are targeted to groups that are
protected under general antidiscrimination law. As a result, the mandates
cannot be analyzed in isolation from antidiscrimination law. Therefore, Part
I's framework, in contrast to much of the existing literature, emphasizes the
importance of antidiscrimination law's restrictions on relative wages and
relative employment levels of accommodated and nonaccommodated work-
ers to the analysis of accommodation mandates. This focus helps to clear up
some of the confusion that presently exists regarding the effects of accom-
modation mandates.
More specifically, Part I reaches the following conclusions:
(I) At the most basic level, the existing literature tends to assume that de-
sirable distributive effects of accommodation mandates for accommodated
workers are either extremely unlikely or (the polar opposite) virtually as-
sured. In the first camp are many economically oriented commentators (both
lawyers and nonlawyers), who uncritically apply the economic model of
mandates directed to workers as a whole (the Summers model)8 to the dis-
tinct context of accommodation mandates.9 On this basis they conclude that
5. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-104(3) (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
62A.041(2) (West 1996).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1994).
7. Id.
8. See note 2 supra.
9. See, e.g., Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates:
Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. ECON. 285, 288 & n.5 (1998) [hereinafter Ruhm, Parental Leave
Mandates]; Christopher J. Ruhm, Policy Watch: The Family and Medical Leave Act, J. ECON.
[Vol. 53:223
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the costs of an accommodation mandate will typically be shifted to the ac-
commodated group in the form of reduced wages or reduced employment
levels-the natural implication of the Summers model, as described more
fully in Part I.A.2.a below. The second camp consists of the many com-
mentators who hail the passage of laws with accommodation mandates, such
as the ADA and the FMLA, without any discussion whatsoever of the poten-
tially adverse effects of these laws on the wages and employment levels of
the accommodated group.lO The truth about accommodation mandates, I
suggest, lies somewhere in between and, not surprisingly, is more complex,
as elaborated in points (H) and (Ill) below.
(H) Of central importance to the distributive effects of accommodation
mandates for accommodated workers is the degree to which the restrictions
on relative wages and relative employment levels imposed by antidiscrimi-
nation law are "binding," in the sense of constraining employers' behavior in
an effective manner. If such restrictions are binding, then an accommodation
mandate will make the accommodated group better off (in a sense that will
be made more precise below) unless the cost of the mandated accommoda-
tion exceeds its value to the accommodated group and the group bears most
or all of that cost. This scenario is described more fully in Part I.B.l.b be-
low. This conclusion marks a striking contrast with the case of mandates
directed to workers as a whole, for in that case, as described in Part I.A.2.a,
the conditions under which a mandate can make workers better off are much
narrower, and the extent of the potential gain is far smaller. The conclusion
about distributive gains to accommodated workers is similar in spirit to
Richard Craswell's conclusions about the effects of consumer (as distin-
guished from employment) mandates on markets populated by heterogene-
ous consumers; however, as detailed below, there are a number of basic dif-
ferences between his analysis and the analysis offered here.,I
(III) The analysis of mandates directed to workers as a whole also yields
incorrect conclusions if only restrictions on wage differentials across groups,
and not restrictions on their differential employment levels, are binding. Be-
cause enforcing rules against discrimination in the hiring of workers is rela-
PERSP., Summer 1997, at 175, 178-79, 180 fig.2 [hereinafter Ruhm, Policy Watch]; Jane Waldfo-
gel, The Impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281, 283
(1999).
10. See, e.g., Peggy R. Mastroianni & David K. Fram, The Family and Medical Leave Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Areas of Contrast and Overlap, 9 LAB. LAw. 553, 553 (1993)
("The [FMLA] and the [ADA] are two of the most important employee protection laws of the last
quarter century.").
11. See Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 398 (1991) (summarizing conclusions about
mandates in the case of heterogeneous consumers); notes 69-74 infra and accompanying text (de-
tailing differences between Craswell's analysis and mine).
Nov. 2000]
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tively difficult, it is often reasonable to assume that only restrictions on wage
differentials are binding, as numerous commentators have emphasized.12 If
the analysis of mandates directed to workers as a whole is applied in this set-
ting, the conclusion is that whether the value of the mandated benefit exceeds
or falls short of its cost is precisely revealed by whether the employment
level of workers rises or falls with the mandate.13 But, as Part I.B.2.a em-
phasizes, with binding restrictions on wage but not employment differentials,
the employment level of the accommodated group will fall with an accom-
modation mandate no matter what the value-cost relationship for the man-
dated accommodation is. Thus, and critically for policy evaluation purposes,
negative employment effects can no longer serve as a proxy for failure to
meet the value-cost condition.
(IV) Since the effects of an accommodation mandate vary significantly
with the degree to which restrictions on wage and employment differentials
are binding in the sense described above, it is important to be able to predict,
at least roughly, when such restrictions are likely to be binding. At its best,
the existing literature on accommodation mandates simply acknowledges the
various possibilities with regard to whether restrictions on wage and em-
ployment differentials may bind.14 (As already mentioned, most of the ex-
isting literature does not even go this far.) The framework developed in Part
I identifies the factors that bear on which of the possible scenarios with re-
gard to wage and employment restrictions is likely to obtain. The framework
thus allows one to generate predictions about the effects of specific accom-
modation mandates-predictions that can be (and are, in Part II below) tested
against the existing empirical evidence on the effects of these mandates. The
factors I identify also allow one to generate predictions about new laws and
their likely policy consequences.
A final contribution of Part I is to resolve a recurring puzzle about ac-
commodation mandates: to the extent that these mandates produce negative
12. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1426 n.36
(1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CH. L. REV.
1311, 1326 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 513, 517-19 (1987); Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, Part IL Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 271, 290 n.105 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Dwight R. Lee, Why Workers Should Want Mandated Benefits To Lower Their
Wages, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 401,403-05 (1996) (analyzing the two cases).
14. See JONATHAN GRUBER, THE EFFICIENCY OF A GROUP-SPECIFIC MANDATED BENEFIT:
EVIDENCE FROM HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR MATERNITY 12-13 (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 4157, 1992); Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives Versus Controls in Fed-
eral Disability Policy, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 3,
11-13 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) [hereinafter DISABILITY AND WORK]; Daron Acemoglu &
Joshua Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act 9 (Jan. 1999) (working paper, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
[V l. 53:223
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consequences for the wages or employment levels of accommodated work-
ers, will the negative effects be felt in wages, employment levels, or both?
Negative effects on wages and employment levels are often treated in an un-
differentiated fashion; for instance, Samuel Issacharoff and Elyse Rosenblum
describe the concern of some commentators that "requiring pregnancy leave
will make female employees more expensive than male employees; therefore
employers will respond by either hiring fewer women or paying females less
than their male counterparts.",5 The question, however, is which of these
things will happen. I identify the factors that bear on this question.
Part II below uses the economic framework developed in Part I to gener-
ate predictions about the effects of the particular accommodation mandates
listed above. 16 In broad terms, my framework predicts that accommodation
mandates targeted to disabled workers will increase or leave unchanged the
wages of these workers relative to the wages of nondisabled workers while
simultaneously reducing disabled workers' relative employment levels; the
framework also predicts that accommodation mandates targeted to female
workers will reduce the relative wages of these workers (contrary to the case
of disabled workers) and will have ambiguous effects on their relative em-
ployment levels. These predictions match up well with the empirical evi-
dence on the effects of accommodation mandates, as explained in Part II.
The predictions and matching empirical evidence raise intriguing nor-
mative questions about the desirability of accommodation mandates. If these
mandates depress the relative employment levels or relative wages of the
targeted group (as the analysis and evidence suggest they often do), should
they be abandoned? What might they be replaced with? Can they be main-
tained while avoiding their negative consequences? Part II's discussion does
not attempt to offer a definitive resolution of these difficult normative ques-
tions (as that is a project quite distinct from my focus in the present work),
but it does highlight some of the relevant considerations and issues, espe-
cially insofar as these are illuminated by the analysis offered here.
The discussion below has two central conclusions. First, accommoda-
tion mandates must be analyzed in light of antidiscrimination law and the
factors that bear on the effectiveness of that law in constraining employers'
behavior. Much of the confusion in the existing literature stems from the
failure to account properly for the economic pressures created by accommo-
dation mandates, on the one hand, and the way in which the law may con-
strain those pressures, on the other. Second, the framework developed here
makes it possible to generate rough predictions about the effects of particular
15. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands ofPregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2196 (1994) (emphasis added).
16. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
Nov. 2000]
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accommodation mandates on the wages and employment levels of accom-
modated workers-predictions that are shown to be broadly consistent with
the empirical evidence.
I. FRAMEWORK
A decade ago, then Professor (now Treasury Secretary) Lawrence Sum-
mers proposed an economic framework for analyzing the effects of mandates
directed to workers as a whole.17 This Part builds on Summers's model to
offer a framework for analyzing the effects of accommodation mandates,
which are directed to subgroups of workers (such as the disabled) rather than
to workers as a whole. (The concept of an "accommodation mandate" is de-
fined more precisely below.) The proposed framework is in the spirit of
Summers's initial treatment of mandates directed to workers as a whole; it
aims to illuminate the essential issues within a graphical framework and
without the use of a complex mathematical model.
The challenge in performing this exercise for accommodation mandates
is that there is no longer a single employment market affected by the legal
intervention. Instead, accommodated and nonaccommodated workers com-
prise distinct, yet interconnected, employment markets. In addition, and re-
latedly, legal restrictions on wage and employment differentials across ac-
commodated and nonaccommodated workers come into play. These features
complicate the analysis of accommodation mandates within a graphical
framework. I show below how these mandates can nonetheless be analyzed
in a relatively simple way that is accessible to policy makers and legal com-
mentators.
The focus throughout the analysis is on the distributive effects of ac-
commodation mandates for accommodated workers, not on these mandates'
efficiency or "justice" aspects, although of course this is not meant to suggest
that only the distributive effects of a law are important.18 The distributive
orientation of my analysis marks a contrast with the existing economics lit-
erature on mandates, which is focused almost exclusively on efficiency.19 Of
course, the focus on distributive consequences implicates the normative
17. Summers, supra note 2.
18. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327,
327-28 (1991).
19. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 622, 625-27 & n.9 (1994); Alan B. Krueger, Observations on Employment-Based Government
Mandates, with Particular Reference to Health Insurance, in LABOR MARKETS, EMPLOYMENT
POLICY, AND JOB CREATION 297, 299-306 (Lewis C. Solmon & Alec R. Levenson eds., 1994);
Olivia S. Mitchell, The Effects of Mandating Benefits Packages, 11 RES. LAB. ECON. 297, 301-02
(Laurie J. Bassi & David L. Crawford eds., 1990); Ruhm, Parental Leave Mandates, supra note 9,
at 288-89; Ruhm, Policy Watch, supra note 9, at 178.
[Vol. 53:223
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question of whether distributive goals would be better achieved through tax-
and-transfer systems.20 But my analysis here is not at all normative in that
sense: it does not seek to defend the use of accommodation mandates, as
opposed to some alternative tool, to achieve distributive goals. Instead, my
focus is simply the positive effects of these mandates on the accommodated
group.
A. Preliminaries
This section lays the groundwork for the analysis to follow. It provides
definitions and offers a methodological background and orientation.
1. Definitions.
a. Accommodation mandates.
The introduction offered a number of specific examples of accommoda-
tion mandates. At this point it is useful to offer a more general definition.
An "accommodation mandate" is a requirement that employers take special
steps in response to the distinctive needs of particular, identifiable demo-
graphic groups of workers. Under this definition, the accommodated work-
ers must comprise a demographic group that is identifiable in advance of the
commencement of the employment relationship. This is the reason that laws
against discrimination-which regulate employers' treatment of identifiable
demographic groups-become important in analyzing accommodation man-
dates.
Some of the examples of accommodation mandates given above may
benefit groups of workers identifiable in advance but also groups that cannot
be identified ahead of time. Indeed the law often takes steps to minimize the
degree to which employers are able to place workers in particular groups
prior to the commencement of the employment relationship; it does this, for
instance, by prohibiting preemployment inquiries into certain topics.21 In
settings in which a worker's condition cannot be known in advance (whether
because of the law or because of some other factor), a mandate of a particular
benefit operates in some respects like an insurance policy, protecting those
who turn out to have the burdensome condition. Disability provides a par-
20. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-27
(2d ed. 1989) (suggesting reasons that redistribution through legal rules may be inferior to redistri-
bution through tax-and-transfer systems).
21. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 132-34 (4th ed. 1998) (reproducing preemployment inquiry guide issued by the West
Virginia Human Rights Commission under the West Virginia Human Rights Act).
Nov. 2000]
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ticularly important example, since many types of disabilities manifest them-
selves not at the time of birth (in a manner analogous to sex or race) but later
on in life.22 The definition of accommodation mandates used here does not
embrace situations such as these. As will become clear below, however,
their analysis would be similar to the analysis of accommodation mandates in
the case of binding restrictions on wage and employment differentials. For
in both instances employers are unable to treat different categories of work-
ers differently in terms of wages or employment levels, either because they
cannot tell who is in which category or because the law effectively constrains
such differential treatment.
Accommodation mandates may sometimes impose special costs on em-
ployers of particular, identifiable demographic groups but also impose such
costs on employers of individuals in other, equally identifiable demographic
groups. For instance, the FMLA's mandate of leave after the birth of a child
requires employers to take steps not only to accommodate female employees
of childbearing age (who will require at least a brief period off from work if
they have a biological child), but also to accommodate male workers who
wish to take parental leave. However, as a result of the undeniable fact that
women who have biological children are disabled for at least a brief period
of time under current medical technology and with current attitudes toward
medical risks, the FMLA's requirement of leave after the birth of a child dis-
proportionately accommodates female workers of childbearing age. This is
all that is required for an accommodation mandate under the definition used
here.
b. Binding restrictions on wage and employment differentials.
Central to the analysis to follow is the role of binding restrictions on
wage and employment differentials across accommodated and nonaccommo-
dated workers. By "binding" restrictions I mean (I) legal restrictions that (II)
effectively constrain employers' behavior. Whether restrictions are binding
in this sense will obviously depend (among other things) both on what the
restrictions attempt to prohibit and on how effectively they are enforced.
A preliminary note on the existing legal restrictions on wage and em-
ployment differentials is important here. These restrictions apply at the level
of the individual employer, not at the level of an occupational category
across an industry.23 As relevant here, this means that an employer that pays
22. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 29 (1996) ("[M]ost people may actually feel themselves to be
behind a veil of ignorance with respect to disability .... ").
23. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin); Ameri-
[Vol. 53:223
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all of its workers less than the wage offered to comparable workers at other
firms is not violating any legal restrictions on "wage differentials," since it is
treating all workers within the firm the same.
c. "Better off, " worse off," and distributive gains.
In analyzing the effects of mandates, the existing literature often makes
use of the terms "better off' and "worse off."24 The analysis below will
adopt these same terms, so it is important to be clear about their meaning.
Workers are "better off" when the combined value of their wage and any
mandated benefit or accommodation is higher and their employment level is
also higher relative to the status quo. Conversely, workers are "worse off'
when the combined value of their wage and any benefit or accommodation
they receive is lower and their employment level is also lower. Cases in
which the combined wage-benefit-accommodation value and the employ-
ment level may move in opposite directions (as in Part I.B.2.a below) cannot
be unambiguously characterized under this approach. "Value" here is defined
by the worker's perception, a point discussed further in Part I.A.2.c below.
When the workers targeted by a mandate are "better off," the mandate
will be said to have produced "distributive gains." Note that for accommo-
dation mandates, the targeted group is accommodated workers. Thus the
concept of "distributive gains" focuses on a subgroup of workers and does
not address either the remaining (nonaccommodated) workers or other po-
tentially affected groups such as employers and consumers. Effects on some
of these other groups are noted briefly below, however.25
2. The existing framework: mandates directed to workers as a whole.
a. Supply and demand analysis.
Figure 1 depicts the standard supply and demand diagram for employ-
ment markets; this diagram is the basis of Summers's model of mandates
directed to workers as a whole and also of the analysis of accommodation
mandates offered here. A few points are necessary by way of background.26
The supply of labor reflects employees' willingness to work at different
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability).
24. E.g., Craswell, supra note 11, at 369-70, 373-75, 378-79; Lee, supra note 13, at 404.
25. See note 42 infra and accompanying text (consumers); note 98 infra and accompanying
text (nonaccommodated workers).
26. For a more in-depth discussion of the supply and demand framework for analyzing em-
ployment markets, see Donohue, supra note 12, at 1412-15.
Nov. 2000]
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wage levels; it slopes upward because employees will generally be willing to
work more (provide more worker-hours) if wages are higher. (More worker-
hours can result from more hours from each employee, more employees in
the labor market, or some combination of these two factors. The analysis
assumes that labor supply is not "backward bending," or downward sloped,
over any relevant region.) The demand for labor reflects employers' demand
for worker-hours at different wage levels; it slopes downward because em-
ployers will demand fewer worker-hours when wages are higher. The value
of a given worker-hour to employers is given by the vertical distance be-
tween the horizontal axis and the demand curve; this distance is equal to the
"marginal revenue product of labor," or amount of revenue generated by that
worker-hour. The marginal revenue product of labor declines with increas-
ing employment levels because of the law of diminishing returns. 27
Labor supply and demand curves are for a single employment market-
for instance, the market for entry-level clerical workers in a given geographic
region. (Sometimes the boundaries of an employment market will be clear;
other times they will not be.) In the analysis below, supply and demand
curves will be drawn as lines for ease of illustration, but nothing in the analy-
sis changes if they are curves instead. The intersection of the supply and
demand curves will give the wage (W) and employment level (E) for the em-
ployment market in question. See Figure 1.
27. I measure the employment level in terms of worker-hours. This differs from the terminol-
ogy in Daniel Hamermesh's classic work on labor demand. DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, LABOR
DEMAND 45 (1993).
[Vol. 53:223
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Figure 1




E # of worker-hours
This simple supply and demand framework is all that is necessary to
analyze the wage and employment effects of a mandate directed to workers
as a whole, as Summers showed. The mandate will shift the labor supply
curve down (in a southeasterly direction) by the value of the mandated bene-
fit to workers, since they will be more willing to supply labor at any given
wage when they receive the benefit in addition.28 This shift is reflected in
the move from S0 to S' in Figure 2 (upper or lower panel). Meanwhile, the
labor demand curve will shift down (in a southwesterly direction) by the cost
of the mandated benefit to employers, since workers' total marginal revenue
product, or overall contribution to firms' revenue, will be lower by the cost
of the benefit (which employers must now provide).29 This shift is reflected
in the move from D' to D' in Figure 2 (upper or lower panel). Summers's
formulation assumes that the mandated benefit creates incremental costs for
employers-that is, it creates costs that rise with the number of worker-
hours-in addition to any fixed or up-front costs that the mandated benefit
may entail.
28. Summers, supra note 2, at 180 & fig. 1.
29. Id.
Nov. 2000]
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Figure 2
Effects of a mandate directed to workers as a whole
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Mandates directed to workers as a whole have very limited distributive
potential within this framework.30 If the mandated benefit is worth less than
its cost, then the downward shift in the labor supply curve will be smaller
than the downward shift in the labor demand curve, and the wage will fall by
more than the value of the benefit, while the employment level will fall.31
Figure 2 (upper panel) illustrates these effects. The wage falls from W° to
W' (more than the value of the benefit), while the employment level falls
from E' to E'. Workers here are unambiguously worse off with the mandate.
If, instead, the mandated benefit is worth more to workers than its cost to
employers, then the downward shift in labor supply will be larger than the
downward shift in labor demand, and the wage will fall by less than the value
of the mandated benefit, while the employment level will rise.32 Figure 2
(bottom panel) illustrates these effects. Here (but only here) are workers
better off with the mandate. And even in this scenario the potential for dis-
tributive gains is quite limited; workers' wage falls by more than the cost of
the mandated benefit (see the bottom panel of Figure 2), and thus their "net
wage gain" (factoring in the value of the benefit) and corresponding em-
ployment gain are limited by the extent of the gap between the value and the
cost of the mandated benefit. If the value of the benefit is precisely equal to
its cost, then workers experience no net wage gain and no employment
gain.33
The basic intuition for why the potential for distributive gains from man-
dates directed to workers as a whole is so limited is well summarized by
Dwight Lee: "[T]he more a mandated benefit is worth to workers, the more
wages will decline when it is provided."34 Craswell emphasizes the same
point in the context of consumer mandates.as The top and bottom panels of
Figure 2 illustrate the phenomenon. As the value of the mandated benefit
rises, the amount of the cost that is shifted to workers in the form of reduced
wages rises as well, limiting the possibility for distributive gains. As shown
below, the situation is much different with accommodation mandates.
30. For a more detailed exposition of the points made in this paragraph and the next, in the
context of consumer rather than employment mandates, see Craswell, supra note 11, at 369-71.
31. Lee, supra note 13, at 404, 405 fig.2.
32. Id. at 403-04 & fig.1.
33. Summers, supra note 2, at 180.
34. Lee, supra note 13, at 402.
35. Craswell, supra note 11, at 372 ("[Tlhe rules whose costs are most heavily passed on are
also the rules that will benefit consumers the most.").
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b. A technical note about supply and demand elasticities.
The basic effects highlighted by the Summers framework do not change
with changes in the elasticities of the labor supply and demand curves (that
is, the steepness of these curves). The tripartite division described above
among cases in which the value of the mandated benefit is less than, is
greater than, or equals its cost, with the corresponding effects on workers,
holds true qualitatively whatever the elasticities of supply and demand.
However, within the three categories, elasticities of supply and demand will
certainly affect the precise size of the wage and employment effects.
A somewhat related point is that within the Summers framework, shifts
in the supply and demand curves are measured in terms of vertical, not hori-
zontal, magnitudes. The shifts measure value and cost changes, and these
changes are denominated in dollars per worker-hour (the vertical axis), not
worker-hours (the horizontal axis). The difference between vertical and
horizontal magnitudes becomes particularly important with very inelastic
(steep) or very elastic (flat) curves; for instance, with a very inelastic supply
curve, a given downward (southeasterly) shift may look very small when
viewed horizontally, even though it is very large when viewed vertically.
c. Simplifying assumptions in the Summers framework.
The Summers model provides a simple and parsimonious way to analyze
the effects of mandates directed to workers as a whole. Because of its sim-
plicity and parsimony, it does not reflect all of the complexities of the range
of actual employment markets. The concern is not that the framework makes
heroic and unrealistic assumptions about human "optimizing" across the
board36 (indeed it makes relatively limited assumptions about the degree to
which people optimize), but instead that institutional features of certain em-
ployment markets and certain employment mandates may not be fully cap-
tured within the framework. These features include:
a) The degree to which a mandate's effects can be fully characterized by
the supply and demand shifts described above. The characterization may be
more apt for some "rule types" than for others, as David Charny has empha-
sized.37
36. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-79 (1998), offer a general discussion of this problem.
37. David Chamy, Global Labor Standards 8-23 (Mar. 2000) (working paper, on file with the
Stanford Law Review).
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b) The degree to which there is heterogeneity among workers within a
given category or group in the value they attach to the mandated benefit.
Craswell offers an analysis of the case of heterogeneity within a group. 38
c) The degree to which a mandate's costs depend on the number of
workers (for instance, where there are fixed per-worker costs) rather than the
number of worker-hours, as the Summers framework assumes.39
d) The degree to which workers are demanded and paid in accordance
with their total marginal revenue product of labor. In some contexts workers
may receive an "efficiency wage" rather than a wage equal to the total mar-
ginal revenue product of labor, and this may bear on the analysis of legal
intervention in employment markets.40
e) The degree to which some of a mandate's costs may be shifted to con-
sumers rather than borne by employers and employees. The Summers
framework reflects a "partial equilibrium" approach in the sense that em-
ployment market effects are examined while holding fixed other factors in
the economy, such as the price of the good the workers are producing. In
this setting, all of the effects of a mandate will be felt by employers and
workers (and none by consumers).41 If, however, some of a mandate's costs
are shifted to consumers (as may well occur in practice, particularly over
longer time frames42), then the effects predicted by the Summers framework
will be quantitatively smaller than the framework would otherwise suggest,
but they should be qualitatively the same, which is what is important for pur-
poses of the present inquiry.
Notwithstanding its omission of these various institutional features, the
parsimonious Summers framework is widely accepted for analysis of the ef-
fects of employment mandates. In addition to the many academic articles
discussed in the introduction and below that apply the Summers framework,
his article is excerpted in a number of leading employment law casebooks.43
38. Craswell, supra note 11, at 372-85.
39. Summers, supra note 2, at 181, notes this issue as an "extra complication" in the case of
health insurance mandates.
40. See generally David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and Dis-
crimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 57 (1998) (analyzing antidiscrimination law under the assumption that workers re-
ceive an "efficiency wage" rather than a wage equal to the marginal revenue product of labor).
41. Cf Lee, supra note 13, at 401 (discussing sharing of costs between employers and em-
ployees).
42. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 491 (1992) ("[B]y driving up the prices of finished goods,
[the ADA] hurts all persons, able and disabled alike, in their role as consumers.").
43. E.g., MARIA O'BREN HYLTON & LORRAINE A. SCHMALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 41 (1998); STEVEN L. WiLLBoRN, STEVART J. SCHVAB & JoHN F.
BURTON, JR., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 921 (2d ed. 1998).
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For these reasons, the Summers framework is taken as the basic building
block for the approach to accommodation mandates developed here.
A final point about the Summers framework is important. That frame-
work assumes "worker sovereignty" in the sense that workers' labor supply
is assumed to shift in accordance with the underlying value of the mandated
benefit to workers.44 For purposes of normative analysis, this assumption is
problematic for a host of familiar reasons: workers may lack adequate in-
formation about the benefit and also may "value" it differently depending on
whether they have an initial legal entitlement to it.45 But for purposes of the
largely positive analysis undertaken here, these problems are not very trou-
bling, since the shift in the labor supply curve may simply be interpreted as
the "value" of the legal intervention as perceived by workers (correctly or
incorrectly). As no normative analysis is undertaken to suggest that a man-
date is desirable or not based on the comparison of this "value" to the cost
associated with it, the relationship between the value as perceived by work-
ers and the true "value" is simply not central for my purposes.
How can the Summers framework be adapted to the case of accommo-
dation mandates?
3. Accommodation mandates.
The key difference between an accommodation mandate and a mandate
directed to workers as a whole is that when an accommodation mandate is
imposed, the willingness to supply labor rises exclusively or disproportion-
ately for the group to which the accommodation is targeted (for instance,
disabled workers or female workers of childbearing age), and the total mar-
ginal revenue product of labor falls exclusively or disproportionately for this
group. Thus the first innovation that will be necessary in analyzing accom-
modation mandates as opposed to mandates directed to workers as a whole is
to separate out two distinct labor markets: the market for workers whom the
mandate accommodates and the market for the remaining workers. Each
market will have its own labor supply and demand curves (although, as noted
in the following paragraph, the demand curves may end up being the same).
And, since the demand for workers of one type will depend, among other
things, on the demand for workers of the other type, it will no longer be pos-
sible to represent everything of interest on a single, two-dimensional supply
and demand diagram, as in the economic analysis of mandates directed to
44. Cf Craswell, supra note 11, at 368-69 (describing assumption of "consumer sovereignty"
in the economic analysis of mandates in the consumer context).
45. See Jolls et al., supra note 36, at 1506-07 (discussing the role of the initial legal entitle-
ment); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Safety Under Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 80, 80 (1981) (outlining informational problems).
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workers as a whole. A more general analytic framework for the analysis of
accommodation mandates is a central goal of this portion of the inquiry.
The second, and critical, innovation that will be necessary in analyzing
accommodation mandates is that laws against discrimination will come into
play. As noted above, accommodation mandates are directed to groups pro-
tected under general antidiscrimination law. As a result, legal restrictions
will prohibit employers from paying less to workers to whom accommoda-
tion mandates are targeted and from refusing to hire or retain these individu-
als. Thus, for example, employers cannot (lawfully) respond to the mandate
of reasonable accommodation of disabled workers under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)46 by paying these workers less or refusing to hire
them in the first place, as discussed more fully in Part I.D.1 below. (If the
legal restrictions just described are fully binding on employers, then workers
in the two groups will face the same labor demand curve despite the differ-
ence (noted above) in their total marginal revenue products of labor. See
Part I.B.l.a below for an elaboration of this point.) As described above, the
implications of legal restrictions on wage and employment differentials for
the consequences of accommodation mandates have been overlooked by
many commentators, who typically generalize from the Summers model of
mandates directed to workers as a whole.47
The framework developed below reflects each of the two innovations
just described. I will refer to the group of workers to whom the mandate is
directed as the "disadvantaged workers," and to the remaining workers as the
"nondisadvantaged workers."
. What are the effects of imposing an accommodation mandate within this
framework? The labor supply curve for disadvantaged workers will shift
down by the value of the accommodation, just as, in the case of a mandate
directed to workers as a whole, the labor supply curve will shift down by the
value of the mandated benefit, as described in Part I.A.2.a above. (The rea-
soning for accommodation mandates is precisely the same as the reasoning
given above for mandates directed to workers as a whole.) The analysis here
46. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. In a previous work, Cass Sunstein, Richard
Thaler and I likewise applied the Summers framework to an accommodation mandate. See Jolls et
al., supra note 36, at 1505-08. It was only in the course of further thinking about this topic that I
came to see that the prevailing approach in the literature, under which the Summers framework is
uncritically applied to accommodation mandates, is incomplete. As discussed below, however, the
correct approach ultimately yields the same qualitative conclusions as the Summers framework for
the specific context of accommodation mandates targeted to female workers of childbearing age,
which was the context addressed in our earlier piece. See Parts II.B and II.C infra (discussing ac-
commodation mandates targeted to female workers); Jolls et al., supra note 36, at 1505-08. But it
yields very different conclusions in other contexts, such as disability, as discussed in detail below.
See Part II.A infra.
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will assume for expositional ease that the accommodation required by the
mandate has no value to nondisadvantaged workers, so that there is no shift
in their labor supply curve. However, the conclusions offered below would
remain qualitatively unchanged if the accommodation had some value to
nondisadvantaged workers (although less than the value to disadvantaged
workers; as noted in Part I.A.l.a, this is the essence of the definition of an
accommodation mandate).
Meanwhile, with regard to labor demand, the effect on the labor demand
curve for each type of worker will depend on whether there are binding re-
strictions on wage and employment differentials between disadvantaged and
nondisadvantaged workers, as discussed more fully in Part I.B below. Be-
cause of the importance of this factor, the analysis in Part I.B is organized
with reference to it. For expositional ease, the analysis will assume through-
out that an accommodation mandate imposes no cost on employers in con-
nection with the employment of nondisadvantaged workers. However, the
conclusions offered below would remain qualitatively unchanged if the man-
date imposed some cost (less than the cost for disadvantaged workers) for
nondisadvantaged workers.
B. Restrictions on Wage and Employment Differentials
This section analyzes the effects of accommodation mandates under al-
ternative assumptions about whether antidiscrimination law's restrictions on
wage and employment differentials across disadvantaged and nondisadvan-
taged workers are binding on employers. A major theme of the discussion is
the way in which these restrictions on wage and employment differentials
significantly alter the conclusions that obtain for mandates directed to work-
ers as a whole. (As noted in the introduction and as discussed in more detail
here, many labor economists and employment law commentators have un-
critically applied the analysis for mandates directed to workers as a whole to
the case of accommodation mandates.) Part I.D below addresses the factors
that bear on whether and when restrictions on wage and employment differ-
entials are likely to be binding.
One possibility with regard to restrictions on wage and employment dif-
ferentials is that both sorts of restrictions are binding; a second is that re-
strictions on wage differentials are binding while restrictions on employment
differentials are not; a third is that restrictions on employment differentials
are binding while restrictions on wage differentials are not; and a fourth is
that neither sort of restriction is binding. This section considers each of these
possibilities in turn, grouping the third and fourth together for analytic con-
venience.
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1. Restrictions on wage and employment differentials are binding.
The first possibility is that both restrictions on wage differentials and re-
strictions on employment differentials between disadvantaged and nondisad-
vantaged workers are binding. As noted above, whether this is true will bear
significantly on how accommodation mandates affect labor demand.
a. Labor demand effects.
With binding restrictions on wage and employment differentials, there
must not be any difference between the wages or employment opportunities
of disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers within a given employment
market. Thus, employers must pay each type of worker the same wage and
must demand each type in proportion to its willingness to supply labor at that
wage. Since employers cannot exhibit differential labor demand for the two
types of workers, labor demand for each type of worker will be based on the
total marginal revenue product of labor for all workers, disadvantaged and
nondisadvantaged, in the employment market in question.
The first effect of an accommodation mandate on labor demand will
therefore be to shift the labor demand curve for each type of worker down-
ward (all else equal), since the mandate will produce a downward shift in the
total marginal revenue product of labor across the employment market in
question. The downward shift in the total marginal revenue product of labor
will occur because employers will incur costs for the mandated accommoda-
tion; the reasoning is just the same as that offered in Part I.A.2.a above for
the case of mandates directed to workers as a whole. The magnitude of the
downward shift with an accommodation mandate will be equal to the aver-
age cost of the mandated accommodation across the employment market in
question, just as in the case of a mandate directed to workers as a whole the
magnitude of the downward shift is equal to the (average) cost of the man-
dated benefit across the relevant employment market.48 The difference in the
context of accommodation mandates is that the average cost will not simply
be equal to the cost of the benefit in question; rather it will be equal to the
cost of the benefit (accommodation) multiplied by the fraction of disadvan-
taged workers in the employment market, since only these workers require
accommodation.
This first effect of an accommodation mandate is depicted in Figure 3
below. The supply and demand curves in this figure are similar to the supply
and demand curves in Figure 2 above, but they are for disadvantaged work-
ers rather than for workers as a whole. However, a distinction between the
48. See Summers, supra note 2, at 180.
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current analysis and the analysis accompanying Figure 2 is that in discussing
demand curves it now becomes important to distinguish between two com-
ponents of the total marginal revenue product of labor across the employ-
ment market in question. (As already noted, the total marginal revenue
product of labor across the employment market in question determines labor
demand.) The first component, which relates to the effect of an accommo-
dation mandate currently under discussion, is the average cost of the man-
dated accommodation across the employment market in question. The sec-
ond component, discussed just below, is the "physical" marginal revenue
product of labor-the value of the marginal physical output that workers
produce. Because the present focus is on the first component, the shift from
the curve Dd° to the curve Dd' in Figure 3 (upper or lower panel) reflects only
the shift due to this first component; the second component is ignored by
assuming that the physical marginal revenue product of labor for disadvan-
taged workers is the same pre- and post-mandate. The Appendix explains
why the curve Dd' is steeper than the curve Dd° in Figure 3; it also presents
much of the rest of the analysis offered here in a more formal way.
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Figure 3
Effects of an accommodation mandate -
Market for disadvantaged workers
Value of accommodation equals or exceeds its cost
wage I Sd
Ed -Ed' # of worker-hours
Value of accommodation is less than its cost
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The second component of labor demand for disadvantaged workers
(based on the total marginal revenue product of labor across the employment
market in question) is, as already noted, the physical marginal revenue prod-
uct of labor for these workers. The downward shift in labor demand in Fig-
ure 3 assumed that this physical marginal revenue product was the same pre-
and post-mandate for disadvantaged workers. But in fact these workers'
physical marginal revenue product will not be the same pre- and post-
mandate. The reason is that their physical marginal revenue product depends
upon the employment level of nondisadvantaged workers, and this will
change with the imposition of the mandate. The downward pressure on the
total marginal revenue product of labor and, hence, on labor demand as a
result of the cost of the mandated accommodation means that the employ-
ment level of nondisadvantaged workers will fall. (A formal proof of this
claim appears in the Appendix.) Intuitively, the accommodation mandate, by
requiring employers to incur costs for disadvantaged workers that nondisad-
vantaged workers will have to share as a consequence of the binding restric-
tions on wage and employment differentials, induces marginal nondisadvan-
taged workers to exit the market. Because the physical marginal revenue
product of labor for disadvantaged workers will be higher after the mandate,
the ultimate post-mandate labor demand curve for these workers will lie
above the curve Dd' in Figure 3.
b. Wage and employment effects.
The foregoing discussion of the effects of an accommodation mandate on
labor demand provides the starting point for analyzing the effects of accom-
modation mandates on the wages and employment levels of disadvantaged
workers. As the division into two separate graphs in Figure 3 suggests, it is
useful to separate the analysis into distinct cases based on the relationship
between the value and the cost of the mandated accommodation. "Value" in
this context means the per-worker-hour value of the accommodation to dis-
advantaged workers, while "cost" refers to the per-disadvantaged-worker-
hour cost of the accommodation to employers.
A threshold question regarding Case 1 below, in which the value of the
accommodation equals or exceeds its cost, is why legal intervention would
ever be necessary in that circumstance. Economists and economically ori-
ented commentators often assert that parties should bargain on their own for
a benefit whose value exceeds its cost.49 There are several responses to this
argument. First, the value of the benefit may not be appreciated by workers
49. E.g., RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 363 (5th ed. 1998).
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because of informational problems.50 Second, workers may value the benefit
less in the absence of an entitlement to it as a consequence of the endowment
effect.51 Third, the benefit may entail fixed as well as incremental costs, and
the fixed-cost component may produce a collective action problem for work-
ers.52 Fourth, adverse selection considerations may interfere with market
provision of the benefit regardless of whether its value exceeds its cost.5 3
For all of these reasons, the benefit may not be provided in the absence of a
mandate even if its value exceeds its cost. The empirical study by Jonathan
Gruber described in Part II.B.2 below provides an example of a situation in
which a mandated benefit apparently had a value greater than its cost and yet
the mandate was necessary for the benefit to be provided.
Case 1-Value of accommodation equals or exceeds its cost. If the value
of the mandated accommodation equals or exceeds its cost, then the down-
ward shift in the labor supply curve for disadvantaged workers will equal or
exceed that cost. (As described in Part I.A.3 above, the labor supply curve
for disadvantaged workers shifts down by the value of the accommodation.)
This shift is reflected in the gap between Sd° and Sd' in Figure 3 (upper
panel). At the same time, as explained above, the gap between Dd° and Dd'
in Figure 3 is given by the average cost of the accommodation in the em-
ployment market in question, or equivalently by the cost of accommodation
multiplied by the proportion of disadvantaged workers in the employment
market. It follows from the preceding statements that the gap between Sd'
and Sd' (which equals or exceeds the cost of the accommodation) must equal
or exceed the gap between Dd° and Dd'. In addition, as explained above, the
post-mandate labor demand curve for disadvantaged workers lies above the
curve Dd', as a result of the increase in the physical marginal revenue product
of disadvantaged workers resulting from the post-mandate decline in nondis-
advantaged employment. Thus the gap between Sd' and Sd' must exceed the
downward shift in the labor demand curve for disadvantaged workers re-
sulting from the imposition of the mandate.
Since, as just noted, the post-mandate labor demand curve for disadvan-
taged workers will lie above the curve Dd' in Figure 3, the mandate will
cause the wage of disadvantaged workers to fall by less than the gap between
Wd' and W' (upper panel of Figure 3). This in turn is less than or equal to
the value of the accommodation. So disadvantaged workers' wage will fall
by less than the value of the accommodation. And their employment level
50. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 19, at 301.
51. See Jolls et al., supra note 36, at 1506-07.
52. See, e.g., Douglas L. Leslie, Accommodating the Disabled 5 (1999), at
http://www.legalessays.com/leslie.pdf.
53. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 2, at 179.
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will rise by more than the gap between Ed' and Ed'. It follows that disad-
vantaged workers will be better off with the mandate.
These conclusions are quite intuitive, but they mark a striking contrast
with the results for the case of mandates directed to workers as a whole. In
that case, as explained in Part I.A.2.a above, if the value of the mandated
benefit exceeds its cost, distributive gains to workers are possible, but they
are limited to the extent of the value-cost gap. This gap is often used to
measure the efficiency of the mandate;54 thus the gains to workers stem from
the mandate's efficiency and not from distributive benefits achieved at the
expense of another party. Jonathan Gruber extends this analysis of mandates
directed to workers as a whole to an accommodation mandate, mandated
leave from work around the time of childbirth:
If the government is [acting efficiently] by mandating maternity leave, then
women will pay for this valuable leave through lower wages. As a result, there
will be no net redistribution toward women; they will be, in essence, buying the
maternity leave.... [A]dvocates of maternity leave cannot have it both ways;
either the government is increasing efficiency or it is redistributing toward
women.
55
The foregoing analysis shows that this reasoning is incorrect if restric-
tions on wage and employment differentials are binding. Even when the
value of the accommodation exceeds its cost, there are purely "redistribu-
tive" (as well as efficiency) benefits to disadvantaged workers from the man-
date, since the costs of the accommodation are shared across all workers. No
such shifting is feasible in the context of mandates directed to workers as a
whole, since there is no other group of workers to whom to shift costs. Of
course, as described below, things will be quite different if restrictions on
wage and employment differentials are not binding. And, in defense of Gru-
ber's argument, the empirical evidence discussed in Parts I1B and II.C sug-
gests that indeed these restrictions are not binding in the context of male-
female differentials.
Shifting of the costs of legal intervention to other parties, as occurs in the
case of accommodation mandates, is often considered a negative conse-
quence of mandates.5 6 But insofar as accommodation mandates are con-
cerned, the precise goal of the legal intervention is (at least in many propo-
nents' view) to "level the playing field" between disadvantaged and nondis-
54. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 11, at 369 (stating that supply and demand shifts measure
value and cost and that in some cases "efficiency can be assessed simply by comparing [these]
shift[s] _. ").
55. Jonathan Gruber, Commentary on Chapter 5, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE
WORKPLACE 157, 157-58 (Francine D. Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997) (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., David Chamy, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1601, 1615 (1996) (discussing cross-subsidization across different groups of workers in the health
insurance context).
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advantaged workers by removing from the former a burden not borne by the
latter.
Note, however, that the cost-shifting feature of an accommodation man-
date in this setting will tend to put pressure on the composition of the em-
ployment market in question. Nondisadvantaged workers, who will be
earning less than the total marginal revenue product of labor for their group,
will prefer jobs in which they are not bearing costs associated with the em-
ployment of disadvantaged workers. By contrast, disadvantaged workers
will be earning more than the total marginal revenue product of labor for
their group, so additional such workers will have an incentive to enter the
market. I discuss this point in greater detail in Part I.D.4 below.
Case 2-Value of accommodation is less than its cost. If the value of the
mandated accommodation is less than its cost, then it is no longer certain that
disadvantaged workers will be better off after the mandate is imposed. The
reason is that the labor supply curve for disadvantaged workers will shift
down by less than the cost of the accommodation (since value is less than
cost), so one can no longer say that this shift, reflected in the gap between
Sd° and Sd' in Figure 3 (lower panel), will necessarily equal or exceed the gap
between Dd* and Dd'.
However, as long as the fraction of nondisadvantaged individuals in the
qualified population is not too small, and the gap between value and cost not
too large, an accommodation mandate will always make disadvantaged
workers better off. If, for example, nondisadvantaged individuals are ninety
percent of the qualified population, then they will tend to constitute the vast
majority of the employment market in question. (Their precise representa-
tion will depend on the shape of their and disadvantaged workers' labor sup-
ply curves and other factors.) If nondisadvantaged workers constitute the
vast majority of the employment market in question, then the fall in the total
marginal revenue product of labor for all workers in that market with the im-
position of an accommodation mandate will be small, since the average cost
of the accommodation across the employment market will be small. And the
smaller the downward shift in the total marginal revenue product of labor
from the accommodation cost, the smaller the gap between the curves Dd°
and Dd' in Figure 3 (lower panel), and hence the lower the likelihood that this
gap will exceed the downward shift in the labor supply curve (Sd° to Sd'). As
long as the downward shift in the labor supply curve equals or exceeds the
gap between Dd° and Dd', the wage of disadvantaged workers will fall by less
than the value of the mandated accommodation, while their employment
level will rise, just as in Case 1 above.
Intuitively, with a relatively high proportion of nondisadvantaged work-
ers in the workplace, and with binding restrictions on wage and employment
differentials, most of the cost of the mandated accommodation will be borne
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by the nondisadvantaged group. The value of the accommodation, however,
is specific to the disadvantaged workers. Thus, even if the value (to disad-
vantaged workers) of the accommodation is less than its cost (to employers),
disadvantaged workers' wage will fall by less than the value of the accom-
modation-unless the cost of the accommodation is extremely large relative
to its value-since much of the cost will be shifted to the nondisadvantaged
group. But, once again, cross-subsidization of this sort may encourage
changes in the composition of the employment market, as discussed in Part
I.D.4 below.
The foregoing analysis suggests a possible distributive ground for ac-
commodation mandates even when the cost of the accommodation exceeds
its value. (As already noted, distributive goals might alternatively be
achieved through a tax-and-transfer regime.57 Again, my goal is not to
mount a normative defense of one form of achieving these goals over an-
other.) In the case of mandates directed to workers as a whole, distributive
considerations cannot justify legal intervention in this setting, since, as noted
in Part I.A.2.a above, the workers' wage will fall by more than the value of
the benefit to them; this occurs because there is no other group to whom to
shift costs. But the case of accommodation mandates is different. Even if
the value of the accommodation is less than its cost, the mandate may make
disadvantaged workers better off because nondisadvantaged workers will
bear some of the associated cost.
This point is especially important because the fact that the value of the
accommodation is less than its cost may reflect precisely the undesirable
distributive situation that the law seeks to remedy. The reason is that "value"
in this economic framework is measured by workers' willingness to pay for
the benefit by accepting lower wages, and the distributive situation (poverty)
of disadvantaged workers might preclude them from accepting lower wages.
This is of course the familiar point that wealth matters greatly for determin-
ing willingness to pay and hence economic "value."5 8
A further contrast between accommodation mandates and mandates di-
rected to workers as a whole is that for the latter mandates the precise meas-
ure of whether the parties to whom the mandate is directed are better off is
(somewhat paradoxically) whether their wage falls by more than the cost of
the benefit,59 which can only happen if the value of the mandated benefit ex-
ceeds its cost, as described in Part I.A.2.a above. With an accommodation
57. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
58. See generally Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 196-201
(1980) (discussing the relationship between an actor's wealth and the actor's willingness to pay for
a good).
59. See Lee, supra note 13, at 403-04; see also note 35 supra (noting Richard Craswell's
analogous conclusion in the context of consumer mandates).
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mandate, by contrast, disadvantaged workers may be better off even if (and
perhaps because of the fact that) their wage falls by less than the cost of the
accommodation; some of the cost is being shifted through lower wages to
nondisadvantaged workers.
c. Relative wages and relative employment levels.
The above discussion focuses on the wage and employment effects of
accommodation mandates for disadvantaged workers. But the same analysis
allows one to reach conclusions about the wage and employment effects for
disadvantaged workers relative to those for nondisadvantaged workers. The
conclusions about relative wages and relative employment levels in turn
make it possible to generate the empirical hypotheses tested in Part II below.
Empirical inquiries naturally focus on relative wages and relative employ-
ment levels to net out potentially confounding background factors such as
changes in the overall state of the economy.
With regard to relative wage effects, the existence of binding restrictions
on wage differentials between the two types of workers means that their
wages will be the same after the imposition of the mandate. (Of course the
"net wage" of disadvantaged workers, factoring in the value of the accom-
modation, will be higher than that of nondisadvantaged workers. But the
following discussion focuses on the monetary wages of the two groups of
workers, since that is what is relevant for generating empirical predictions of
the sort tested in Part IL)
Before the imposition of the mandate, the disadvantaged workers' wage
may have been less than that of nondisadvantaged workers; this would be the
case if disadvantaged workers were less attractive to employers even before
the mandated accommodation (say because of discrimination or reduced pro-
ductivity) and restrictions on wage differentials were only imposed when the
accommodation mandate went into place. A possible example here is the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA);60 disabled workers may have been
regarded by employers as more costly even prior to the accommodation
mandate, and no (federal) law restricted wage differentials prior to the
ADA's enactment. If disadvantaged workers earned less than nondisadvan-
taged workers prior to the imposition of the mandate, then the mandate will
have the effect of increasing their relative wage.
It is also possible that the disadvantaged workers' wage was the same as
that of nondisadvantaged workers prior to the imposition of the mandate.
This could occur, for example, if disadvantaged workers were equally attrac-
tive to employers prior to the mandate and only become more costly for em-
60. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
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ployers to employ as a result of the intervention. (In this case the "disad-
vantage" of these workers would stem from the need to finance their own
accommodation prior to the mandate.) Here, obviously, the mandate will
leave unchanged the relative wage of disadvantaged workers. Another case
in which the wage of disadvantaged workers would equal that of nondisad-
vantaged workers before as well as after the mandate is the case in which
binding restrictions on wage differentials existed even before the imposition
of the mandate. However, as Part II makes clear, none of the accommoda-
tion mandates discussed here (and none of which I am aware) involves a
situation in which it appears that there were binding restrictions on wage and
employment differentials both before and after the imposition of the man-
date.
It follows from the foregoing discussion that the relative wage of disad-
vantaged workers will either rise or stay the same with the imposition of an
accommodation mandate. (As a result of the binding restrictions on wage
differentials, it could not fall.) Note that this conclusion holds true whatever
the relationship between the value and the cost of the mandated accommoda-
tion; there is no difference between Case 1 and Case 2 above for these pur-
poses.
With regard to relative employment levels, the relative employment level
of disadvantaged workers is likely to rise with the imposition of an accom-
modation mandate given binding restrictions on wage and employment dif-
ferentials. The relative employment level of these workers is certain to rise
when the value of the mandated accommodation equals or exceeds its cost
(Case 1 above), since in that case, as explained above, the absolute employ-
ment level of disadvantaged workers will rise while the absolute employment
level of nondisadvantaged workers will fall. Likewise, in the case in which
the value of the mandated accommodation is less than its cost (Case 2), the
relative employment level of disadvantaged workers will rise as long as their
absolute employment level does, since, again, the absolute level of nondisad-
vantaged employment falls. As described above, the absolute level of disad-
vantaged employment will rise as long as the fraction of nondisadvantaged
individuals in the qualified population is not too small and the gap between
the value and the cost of the mandated accommodation is not too large.
The foregoing discussion has been somewhat intricate at points (far more
so than the remaining analysis will be), but the central conclusions are easy
to distill. First, accommodation mandates have far greater potential than
might otherwise be realized to achieve distributive gains for disadvantaged
workers. (However, at this point it is only a potential, and, as the analysis in
Part II suggests, that potential has gone significantly unrecognized under ex-
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isting law.) If restrictions on wage and employment differentials are binding
on employers, then even a mandated accommodation whose value exceeds
its cost produces many of its gains to disadvantaged workers through cost-
sharing with nondisadvantaged workers, and an accommodation whose value
falls short of its cost may produce gains for disadvantaged workers as a result
of the same sort of cost-sharing. Both of these conclusions are contrary to
those reached using the existing framework for mandates directed to workers
as a whole.
The other critical set of conclusions from the above discussion concerns
the relative wage and relative employment effects of accommodation man-
dates. These are important for purposes of Part H's empirical analysis. The
conclusions about relative wage and relative employment effects are summa-
rized in the first and second rows of Table 1.
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Table 1
Effects of an accommodation mandate on the relative wage and
relative employment level of disadvantaged workers
Scenario Effect of man- Effect of mandate on
date on relative relative employment
wage level
Restrictions on Value of accom- Rises or stays Rises
wage and em- modation equals the same
ployment dif- or exceeds its
ferentials are cost
binding Value of accom- Rises or stays Rises, unless either the
modation is less the same fraction of non-
than its cost disadvantaged indi-
viduals in the qualified
population is very
small or the gap be-
tween value and cost
is very large.
Restrictions on Rises or stays Falls







Restrictions on Value of accom- Falls Rises
wage differen- modation ex-
tials are not ceeds its cost
binding (re-
strictions on Value of accom- Falls NoChange
employment modation equals
differentials its cost
may or may Value of accom- Falls Falls
not be binding) modation is less
than its cost
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2. Restrictions on wage differentials are binding, but restrictions on
employment differentials are not.
The previous section analyzed the effects of accommodation mandates
under the assumption that restrictions on both wage and employment differ-
entials between disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers were binding.
This section relaxes that assumption and assumes that only restrictions on
wage differentials are binding.
a. Wage and employment effects.
With binding restrictions on wage differentials across disadvantaged and
nondisadvantaged workers, the two types of workers must receive the same
wage, despite the fact that one group of workers-the disadvantaged group--
will be more expensive to employ. Employers will thus have an incentive
not to employ members of the disadvantaged group. Since restrictions on
employment differentials are not binding, they will be able to get away with
such behavior. (This is the critical contrast with Part I.B. 1 above.)
The fact that an accommodation mandate will produce negative em-
ployment effects for disadvantaged workers in this scenario is of course
rather obvious; in fact a similar point may be found in Summers's original
article, in which he notes that if different groups of workers impose differen-
tial costs and wage differences are precluded, employers will "seek to hire
workers with lower benefit costs." 61 What is not so obvious, and what has
not been appreciated in the existing literature, is that the negative employ-
ment effects for disadvantaged workers in this setting mean that one cannot
infer the relationship between the value and the cost of the mandated ac-
commodation from its employment consequences. Even if the value of the
mandated accommodation is incredibly high, so that disadvantaged workers
would be willing to work for far lower wages, employers are legally fore-
closed from paying them lower wages, and thus the mandate ends up pro-
ducing job loss for the disadvantaged group. This conclusion contrasts
strongly with the case of mandates directed to workers as a whole, for in that
setting employment losses from the mandate directly imply that the man-
dated benefit is valued at less than its cost, as Figure 2 in Part I.A.2.a above
indicates.
A related contrast with the case of mandates directed to workers as a
whole is that for accommodation mandates the value-cost relationship no
longer determines whether there will be distributive gains for targeted work-
ers. In the case of mandates directed to workers as a whole, the greater the
61. Summers, supra note 2, at 182.
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value of the mandated benefit to the workers to whom it is directed relative
to its cost, the more likely the workers are to gain from the mandate, as
shown in Part I.A.2.a above. The same is not true in the case of accommo-
dation mandates if restrictions on wage differentials are binding while re-
strictions on employment differentials are not. Even if the value of the man-
dated accommodation greatly exceeds its cost, the employment level of dis-
advantaged workers will fall, and thus the accommodated group will not be
better off in the sense described above.
Again, a natural question here is why a mandate would ever be necessary
if the value of the mandated accommodation exceeds its cost. As noted
above, the existing literature offers a range of responses to that question.62
The conclusion that disadvantaged workers will face negative employ-
ment effects in response to an accommodation mandate with binding restric-
tions on wage but not employment differentials is independent not only of
the value-cost relationship but also of the proportion of nondisadvantaged
workers in the qualified population. Whereas a high proportion of nondisad-
vantaged workers makes it more likely that the disadvantaged workers will
gain from an accommodation mandate if restrictions on wage and employ-
ment differentials are binding and the value of the mandated accommodation
falls short of its cost (Case 2 in the preceding section), in the present sce-
nario, with only wage differentials binding, it is irrelevant what proportions
of the qualified population hail from the disadvantaged and nondisadvan-
taged groups. However many or few disadvantaged individuals there are,
employers will simply not want to hire them.
A possible mitigating effect would occur if some employers began to
hire exclusively disadvantaged workers, paying a lower wage to reflect the
cost of the mandated accommodation. Disadvantaged workers might prefer
these lower-paying jobs to unemployment, and the employers involved
would not be running afoul of restrictions on wage differentials because they
would be employing exclusively disadvantaged workers. (Recall from Part
I.A. 1.b above that the law only polices differential practices within a given
firm.) Assuming quite plausibly, however, that this possibility is not enough
to undo the general negative employment effects of the mandate for disad-
vantaged workers, these workers will experience job loss in the wake of the
mandate.
b. Relative wages and relative employment levels.
The discussion thus far of binding restrictions on wage but not employ-
ment differentials has focused on the absolute employment effects of ac-
62. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
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commodation mandates for disadvantaged workers. However, exactly the
same reasoning-that at a constant wage employers will always prefer non-
disadvantaged to disadvantaged workers after a mandate is imposed-shows
that the employment level of disadvantaged workers relative to that of non-
disadvantaged workers will also fall.
In terms of the relative wage of disadvantaged workers, the relative wage
of those who are employed after the mandate will rise or stay the same, sub-
ject to the caveat just above about disadvantaged-only firms, which may pay
lower wages. The reasoning behind the conclusion that the relative wage
will rise or stay the same parallels that offered in Part I.B.l.c above for the
case in which both restrictions on wage differentials and restrictions on em-
ployment differentials are binding; nothing in that argument relied on the
existence of binding restrictions on employment differentials, and so the ar-
gument carries over directly to the current context.
3. Restrictions on wage differentials are not binding.
This section considers the case in which restrictions on wage differen-
tials are not binding. Without binding restrictions on wage differentials, em-
ployers will not have any reason to prefer one type of worker to the other; if
too many of either type want to work at a given wage, then their wage will
simply be lowered (since no legal restriction precludes this). Thus, when
restrictions on wage differentials are not binding, it becomes irrelevant
whether restrictions on employment differentials are binding or not; the fol-
lowing analysis applies equally to either case.
a. Wage and employment effects.
Since employers are unrestricted in their ability to pay differential
wages, each group of workers will face its own labor demand curve based on
the total marginal revenue product of labor for that group. After an accom-
modation mandate, the total marginal revenue product of labor for disadvan-
taged workers will be lower than it was before by the cost of the mandated
accommodation; the reasoning is just the same as that offered in Part I.A.2.a
above for the case of a mandate directed to workers as a whole. This down-
ward shift in labor demand is analogous to the first effect of an accommoda-
tion mandate discussed in Part I.B.l.a above (when restrictions on both wage
and employment differentials are binding), but the critical difference is that
here, just as in the case of a mandate directed to workers as a whole, the la-
bor demand curve for the group targeted by the mandate falls by the full cost
of what is mandated, rather than, as in Part I.B. 1.a, by the average cost of
what is mandated across the disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers in
the employment market in question. The lack of binding restrictions on
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wage differentials means that the effect of an accommodation mandate is
localized to disadvantaged workers, a conclusion similar to the one reached
for the case of a mandate directed to workers as a whole.
In fact, the only difference between this setting and the case of a mandate
directed to workers as a whole is that here there is still some interdependence
between the labor demand curve for disadvantaged workers and what is hap-
pening in the market for nondisadvantaged workers. This interdependence
stems from the fact that the physical marginal revenue product of disadvan-
taged workers (the second component of the analysis from Part I.B.l.a
above) will depend on the employment level of nondisadvantaged workers.
As shown in the Appendix, in the absence of binding restrictions on wage
differentials the employment level of nondisadvantaged workers will fall
with the imposition of an accommodation mandate if the value of the man-
dated accommodation exceeds its cost and will rise if the opposite is true.
The intuition for the effects of an accommodation mandate on nondisad-
vantaged employment is straightforward. If the value of the mandated ac-
commodation exceeds its cost, then disadvantaged workers have in effect
become cheaper to employ than they were before the mandate, so employers
will substitute toward them and away from nondisadvantaged workers.
(Again, reasons that a mandate might be necessary when the value of the ac-
commodation exceeds its cost are discussed above.63) Conversely, if the
value of the mandated accommodation falls short of its cost, then employers
will substitute away from disadvantaged workers toward nondisadvantaged
workers, who have effectively become cheaper to employ (relative to disad-
vantaged workers) after the mandate.
The fall in nondisadvantaged employment when the value of the accom-
modation exceeds its cost will shift up the labor demand curve for disadvan-
taged workers relative to the case of a mandate directed to workers as a
whole. This means a smaller wage decrease and a larger employment gain
for disadvantaged workers than would be suggested by the analysis of man-
dates directed to workers as a whole. But even in that analysis the wage fell
by less than the value of the mandated benefit, and the employment level
rose, all as described in Part I.A.2.a. It follows that disadvantaged workers
here are better off after the imposition of the accommodation mandate, and
that this is true to an even greater degree than in the model of mandates di-
rected to workers as a whole.
Conversely, when the value of the mandated accommodation falls short
of its cost, the associated rise in nondisadvantaged employment will shift
down the labor demand curve for disadvantaged workers relative to the case
63. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
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of a mandate directed to workers as a whole. This means a larger wage de-
crease and a larger employment loss for disadvantaged workers than would
be suggested by the analysis of mandates directed to workers as a whole.
But even in that analysis the wage fell by more than the value of the man-
dated benefit, and the employment level fell, as described in Part I.A.2.a. It
follows that disadvantaged workers are worse off after the imposition of the
accommodation mandate, and that this is true to an even greater degree than
in the model of mandates directed to workers as a whole.
If the value of the mandated accommodation is exactly equal to its cost,
then, as shown in the Appendix, the employment level of nondisadvantaged
workers will remain unchanged after the mandate is imposed. It follows that
the wage and employment effects of an accommodation mandate for disad-
vantaged workers will be exactly the same as the wage and employment ef-
fects of a mandate directed to workers as a whole. Tracking the analysis in
Part I.A.2.a, the wage of disadvantaged workers will fall by exactly the value
of the mandated accommodation, while their employment level will remain
unaffected.
To summarize, then, the tripartite set of results for mandates directed to
workers as a whole, based on whether the value of the mandated benefit ex-
ceeds, falls short of, or equals its cost, will be mirrored in the case of ac-
commodation mandates with no binding restrictions on wage differentials.
Quantitatively, however, the effects of an accommodation mandate when
value either exceeds or falls short of cost will be larger than those of a man-
date directed to workers as a whole.
In light of the interrelationship described here between the markets for
disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers, my analysis differs from
Craswell's claim in the context of consumer mandates that "[i]f sellers could
charge different prices to [different buyers], each group of buyers could be
analyzed as a separate submarket consisting of essentially homogeneous con-
sumers," so that the conclusions for the case of a single market "could then
be restated for each submarket."64 In the present context, the conclusions are
not precisely identical to the case of a mandate directed to workers as a
whole, even without binding restrictions on wage differentials, since the two
submarkets for labor affect each other. As Daniel Hamermesh notes, a pol-
icy directed to "a certain demographic group of workers ... will affect not
only their employment but the employment of other workers as well."s The
same sort of interrelationship presumably would arise in the consumer con-
text, for reasons similar to those given just above for employment markets,
64. Craswell, supra note 11, at 373 n.19.
65. HAMERMESH, supra note 27, at 178.
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but I do not pursue the point here because it is quite distinct from the focus
of my present inquiry.
b. Relative wages and relative employment levels.
What are the effects of an accommodation mandate on relative wages
and relative employment levels in this setting? After the imposition of the
mandate, since employers are unrestricted, both types of workers will be paid
in accordance with the total marginal revenue product of labor for their
group, as noted above. Thus, the post-mandate wage of disadvantaged
workers will be equal to the physical marginal revenue product of labor at
the post-mandate levels of disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged employment
minus the cost of the mandated accommodation and minus the cost, if any,
associated with employing disadvantaged workers wholly apart from the
mandate. Meanwhile, the post-mandate wage of nondisadvantaged workers
will be equal to the physical marginal revenue product of labor at the post-
mandate levels of disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged employment. So the
gap between the post-mandate wages of the two groups is equal to the sum of
the cost of the mandated accommodation and the cost, if any, of employing
disadvantaged workers wholly apart from the mandate. Meanwhile, before
the imposition of the mandate the gap between the two wages was simply the
preexisting cost, if any, of employing disadvantaged workers. It follows that
the relative wage of disadvantaged workers must fall with the mandate.
This conclusion is of course highly intuitive. The mandate imposes a
new cost on disadvantaged workers, and nothing prevents employers from
passing this cost on to these workers in the form of reduced wages. If em-
ployers were not paying disadvantaged workers a wage less than that of non-
disadvantaged workers by the cost of the mandated accommodation, then
employers would always prefer to hire exclusively nondisadvantaged work-
ers. Only if a new gap between disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged work-
ers' wages is introduced after the mandate is imposed will employers be
willing to employ both types of workers. For this reason the relative wage of
disadvantaged workers must fall with the imposition of the mandate.
The relative employment effects of an accommodation mandate in this
setting are also straightforward. If the value of the mandated accommoda-
tion exceeds its cost, then, as described above, the absolute employment
level of disadvantaged workers rises, while the absolute employment level of
nondisadvantaged workers falls. The opposite occurs if the value of the
mandated accommodation falls short of its cost, and both groups' employ-
ment levels stay the same if value equals cost. It follows that the relative
employment level of disadvantaged workers rises if the value of the man-
dated accommodation exceeds its cost, falls if the value of the mandated ac-
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commodation falls short of its cost, and is unchanged if the value and cost
are equal.
Table 1 above provides a summary of all of the relative wage and rela-
tive employment level effects of accommodation mandates under different
assumptions about whether restrictions on wage and employment differen-
tials are binding. As already noted, this table will provide a useful reference
for the analysis of specific accommodation mandates in Part II.
C. Related Literature
The closest analogue in the existing literature to the analysis offered just
above of the effects of accommodation mandates is Craswell's treatment of
the effects of consumer mandates in situations of consumer heterogeneity. 66
The scenario that Craswell considers has some important parallels with the
case of accommodation mandates. As noted in the introduction, his conclu-
sion that a mandate may produce distributive gains even when the mandate is
inefficient,67 in the sense that the value of the mandated benefit falls short of
its cost,68 is mirrored in the analysis offered here.
By the same token, there are a series of important differences between
Craswell's analysis and my own. First, Craswell assumes that different con-
sumers must receive the same treatment in the market,69 whereas a critical
point of my framework is that the effects of an accommodation mandate de-
pend precisely on whether differential treatment of differently situated
groups is feasible. If restrictions on wage and employment differentials are
not binding, so that such differential treatment is possible, then an accommo-
dation mandate will have very different effects than would otherwise occur.
Second, on the level of modeling assumptions, Craswell assumes not that
buyers are distinguished into two groups (for instance, uninformed and in-
formed, or in my context disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged), but instead
that they are distinguished along a continuum, with some consumers "mar-
ginal" and some "inframarginal."70 Thus Craswell does not analyze two dis-
tinct markets, as the analysis here does, and his approach does not draw upon
two distinct supply and demand interactions, as the analysis here does. In-
stead the variation across consumers in his analysis can be fully captured in
the relative slopes of the pre- and post-mandate demand curves on a single
supply and demand diagram.71 Focusing on the existence of two distinct
66. Craswell, supra note 11, at 372-85.
67. See id. at 378-79, 380.
68. See note 54 supra (giving definition of efficiency in terms of the value-cost relationship).
69. Craswell, supra note 11, at 373.
70. Id. at 373-76.
71. See id. at 378-79 & fig.5.
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markets, as I do here, illuminates points such as the one noted above about
how the effects of an accommodation mandate when restrictions on wage
differentials are not binding differ from the effects of a mandate directed to
workers as a whole.72 A generalization of both frameworks would combine
the separation of distinct markets and the recognition of heterogeneity of ac-
tors within each market.73
Related to the difference in modeling assumptions, a third difference
between Craswell's analysis and mine is that the source of distributive gains
in Craswell's approach-and in similar lines of reasoning offered earlier by
Bruce Ackerman, Duncan Kennedy, and Richard Markovits4-is quite dis-
tinct from the source of the distributive gains in my analysis. In the articles
just mentioned, the distributive gains stem from the nature of the marginal
versus the inframarginal consumers' preferences; the low valuation of a
mandate by marginal consumers limits the degree of the price increase re-
sulting from the mandate, and thus this price increase may be less than the
valuations of the mandate by inframarginal consumers. By contrast, in my
analysis the distributive gains occur wholly apart from any differences in
preferences between marginal and inframarginal actors (although such gains
might well also be produced by such differences).
Another case in which, as in my analysis, a mandate may make a sub-
group better off even if that group values the mandated benefit at less than its
cost is discussed in an article on pension antidiscrimination rules by Joseph
Bankman.75 Bankman examines the effect of tax rules that require employ-
ers to provide comparable levels of pension and other benefits to highly
compensated and non-highly compensated employees if they choose to offer
benefits at all. These rules are somewhat akin to a mandate of benefits for
non-highly compensated employees because of the common assumption
(which Bankman makes76) that the benefits are quite valuable to highly com-
pensated employees (hence employers will want to offer benefits) but not
very valuable to non-highly compensated employees. Banlkman shows that
72. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
74. Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1105-06 (1971);
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 611-12 &
App. B(1) (1982); Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Over-
all Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815,
1818-27 (1976); see also Craswell, supra note 11, at 380-83 (lucidly distilling the essentials of
Ackerman's argument).
75. Joseph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-File Com-
pensation, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (1994).
76. Id. at 602-03.
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even if the benefits are worth less to non-highly compensated employees
than they cost employers to provide, non-highly compensated employees
may be better off with the mandate of comparable coverage.77
Again, however, the source of the distributive gains is quite distinct from
the source of these gains in the analysis of accommodation mandates offered
above. In Bankman's case the mechanism for the gains is elimination of the
benefits plan (not highly valued by the non-highly compensated employees)
altogether and the concomitant increase in the relative attractiveness of em-
ploying non-highly compensated employees versus highly compensated em-
ployees.78 In my analysis, by contrast, the distributive gain occurs because
of the persistence, not the elimination, of a nonwage benefit (such as the
ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodation). In addition, Bankman,
like Craswell, does not consider the effects of restrictions on wage and em-
ployment differentials across workers who are and are not targeted by the
mandate, for the quite natural reason that the law does not impose any such
restrictions insofar as highly compensated versus non-highly compensated
employees are concerned.
D. When Will Restrictions on Wage and Employment Differentials Bind?
The analysis in Part I.B shows the importance of whether restrictions on
wage and employment differentials between disadvantaged and nondisad-
vantaged workers bind for determining the effects of accommodation man-
dates. As has been described, misimpressions often arise from an uncritical
application of the model of mandates directed to workers as a whole to the
distinct context of accommodation mandates. The present section takes the
next step and describes when each set of circumstances, with regard to
whether restrictions on wage and employment differentials will bind, is
likely to obtain. It also discusses the important question of when the effects
of an accommodation mandate are likely to be felt primarily in wages and
when they are likely to be felt primarily in employment levels.
Of course, many factors go into whether legal restrictions will bind, in
the sense of effectively constraining actors' behavior. In part, control of be-
havior will depend on the degree to which the law exerts a moral force that
leads actors to obey it wholly apart from enforcement pressures. The fol-
lowing discussion, however, focuses on what the law aims to prohibit and on
how effectively it can be enforced; these factors lend themselves much more
to the predictive analysis about the effects of different accommodation man-
dates that is undertaken in Part II below.
77. See id. at 609.
78. See id.
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1. Scope of the law.
As a threshold matter, it is important to consider whether the law at-
tempts to restrict wage and employment differentials between disadvantaged
and nondisadvantaged workers in response to an accommodation mandate.
No one questions that the law attempts to restrict employment differentials;
thus, employers cannot lawfully respond to the cost of a mandated accom-
modation by refusing to hire disadvantaged workers. The question that re-
quires a bit more discussion is whether wage adjustments are permitted in
response to the cost of a mandated accommodation.
It is clear that wage adjustments are not permitted based on the average
cost of employing a member of the disadvantaged group. In City of Los An-
geles v. Manhart79 the Supreme Court faced an antidiscrimination challenge
to an employer's practice of charging women more than men for an em-
ployer-provided pension policy. The employer charged women more be-
cause women on average tend to live longer than men, and thus it costs more
to provide women with a pension policy (holding fixed the annual payment).
The extra charge was of course the functional equivalent of a lower wage
(compared to otherwise similarly situated male workers) resulting from the
cost of the pension benefit. The Court held that the employer's practice of
(in effect) adjusting women's wages in response to the cost of the pension
plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8o Although Manhart
,did not involve any sort of mandate (as the pension benefits in question were
voluntarily provided by the employer), the case stands for the general propo-
sition that an employer may not pay differential wages based on the average
cost of employing members of two different groups (where group status turns
on a protected trait such as sex).
But is a wage adjustment permissible when it is clear that a particular
employee is more costly to employ because of an accommodation mandate?
Are there any examples of such cases? Most accommodation mandates do
not fit this scenario, since the mandate increases the average cost of em-
ploying members of the disadvantaged group, but it may not increase the cost
of employing a given member of that group at all. For instance, the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) increases the average cost of employing
disabled and female employees,81 but it will not increase the cost of em-
ploying certain individual disabled and female employees at all. And it will
79. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
80. See id. at 707-11.
81. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53:223
HeinOnline -- 53 Stan. L. Rev. 264 2000-2001
ACCOMMODATIONMANDATES
generally be quite difficult for the employer to pinpoint in advance which
employees will end up being costly.82
The most obvious exception to the statements made in the previous para-
graph is the mandate of reasonable accommodation under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA),83 since one could certainly imagine that there
are cases in which the cost of accommodating a given individual is fairly
well known in advance, based, for instance, on the employer's past experi-
ence in accommodating the individual's particular disability. Perhaps be-
cause the issue seems most likely to arise with disabilities (although for
similar reasons one could imagine it arising in the pregnancy context too),
the ADA context is the one area of which I am aware in which the question
of the permissibility of wage adjustments has been addressed. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interpretive guidance under
the ADA states that wage adjustments are permissible if a particular accom-
modation would not be required (because it would cause "undue hardship")
in the absence of such adjustments.84 It seems a clear inference from this
provision that wage adjustments are not permitted-despite the clear costs an
accommodation may entail-when the accommodation is otherwise required
by the ADA. Consistent with this suggestion, the EEOC interpretive guid-
ance provides that "the individual's willingness to provide his or her own
accommodation does not relieve the employer of the duty to provide the ac-
commodation should the individual for any reason be unable or unwilling to
continue to provide the accommodation."85
Thus, it seems fairly clear that the law restricts both wage and employ-
ment adjustments in response to the cost of a mandated accommodation. But
are these restrictions enforceable in practice?
2. Occupational integration.
The first question that must be asked in considering whether restrictions
on wage and employment differentials between disadvantaged and nondisad-
vantaged workers are enforceable is whether there is substantial occupational
integration of the disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged groups, or whether
instead they are significantly segregated. Occupational segregation is gener-
ally measured by the Duncan Index, which is given by the proportion of
82. In the specific context of sex, if the employer could pinpoint this in advance, without re-
lying in any way on the trait of sex, then corresponding wage adjustments would be permissible
according to the Manhart Court. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 713 n.24.
83. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
84. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 371 (2000) (EEOC Interpretive Guidance to 29 C.F.R. §
1630.15(d)).
85. Id. at 365 (EEOC Interpretive Guidance to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9).
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workers of one group (either disadvantaged workers or nondisadvantaged
workers in the present context) who would have to change occupations for
the occupational distributions of the two groups to be the same.86
In the absence of significant occupational segregation, binding restric-
tions on wage differentials are likely to exist. To begin, these restrictions are
generally fairly easy to enforce.87 Moreover, employers may have incentives
to adhere to norms of pay equity wholly apart from legal restrictions because
of the potential morale problems that can result from inequity in wages be-
tween different groups performing the same work.88
The problem arises with enforcement of restrictions on employment dif-
ferentials, which are notoriously harder to police. There is in fact a broadly
held view that such restrictions are significantly limited in their enforceabil-
ity, specifically insofar as restrictions on hiring differentials are concerned.89
Enforcement is particularly difficult when disadvantaged workers comprise a
relatively small proportion of the qualified labor pool for the relevant em-
ployment market. For in this case it will be difficult or impossible to make
out a statistical showing of differential employment by any but the very larg-
est firms.
A numerical example will illustrate this point. Suppose that disadvan-
taged workers comprise 0.5 percent of the qualified labor pool for a given
employment market. (This might seem like a small percentage, but certainly
the percentage of certain groups of disabled workers, such as the blind, is far
lower. The issue of whether blind workers should be aggregated with other
disabled workers for purposes of statistical comparisons is discussed more
fully in Part II.A.1 below.) And consider an employer with 200 employees
in that market. Suppose none of its workers are from the disadvantaged
group. This could reflect differential treatment of disadvantaged workers, or
it could reflect pure chance. On average a 200-employee division should
have one disadvantaged worker, but random deviations from this result
would be expected purely as a matter of chance. Now suppose that the em-
ployer has 400 employees in the relevant category and still no disadvantaged
employees. This looks worse for the employer, but still the result could eas-
ily happen as a matter of chance. Only with a firm that has a very large
number of employees in the relevant employment market will an outsider be
86. See Francine D. Blau, Patricia Simpson & Deborah Anderson, Continuing Progress?
Trends in Occupational Segregation in the United States over the 1970s and 1980s, 4 FEMINIST
EcoN. 29, 33-34 (1998) (describing the Duncan Index).
87. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, supra note 12, at 517.
88. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 19, at 626 ("[W]orkplace norms that prohibit different pay
across groups... may have similar effects to antidiscrimination rules.").
89. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 12, at 1426 n.36; Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of
Title VII, supra note 12, at 517-19; Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 12, at 290 n.105.
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able to draw reliable inferences from disparities between the number of dis-
advantaged workers in the employer's workforce and the number of such
workers in the qualified population.90
The point here is that the size of the disadvantaged group interacts with
the size of the relevant employer division in determining how difficult it is to
establish differential employment patterns for disadvantaged and nondisad-
vantaged workers. While it is easy to imagine an employer division in which
the absence of any female employees would be suspicious, it is difficult to
imagine a division in which the absence of any blind employees would be
suspicious. There are of course ways to attempt to deal with the statistical
problems presented by small firms or small divisions within firms,91 but
these will not make the problem go away or even reduce it to a significant
degree. Thus, the proportion of disadvantaged individuals in the qualified
population, viewed in relation to the typical employer division size at issue,
will be an important factor in determining whether restrictions on employ-
ment differentials between disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers
will bind.
Large firms are more likely to face binding restrictions on employment
differentials for other reasons as well. There may be economies of scale in
regulatory compliance. Moreover, a firm with more than one hundred em-
ployees must file an annual form (called an EEO-1) reporting the composi-
tion of its workforce.92 It is likely that a firm required to report in this way
will be more sensitive, all else equal, to the representation of disadvantaged
workers in its workforce than a firm not subject to the reporting requirement.
The suggestion here is of course not that the size of the disadvantaged
group relative to the size of the employer division in question is the sole, or
even the primary, factor in determining the degree to which restrictions on
employment differentials are binding. A large number of employment dis-
crimination claims do not even involve statistical comparisons between dis-
advantaged and nondisadvantaged workers' representation in the employ-
ment market at all. The need to rely on statistical claims may be particularly
limited in the disability context, where (among other things) employers may
be less careful about disguising discriminatory influences on their decisions.
The general point is simply that, all else equal, restrictions on employment
differentials will be more likely to bind with greater levels of disadvantaged
90. Judge Frank Easterbrook nicely describes the dynamics in this sort of setting in Hill v.
Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1999).
91. See Michael J. Piette & Paul F. White, Approaches for Dealing with Small Sample Sizes
in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 12 J. FoRENSiC ECON. 43 (1999), for a recent discussion.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2000).
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representation in the qualified labor pool than with lesser levels of disadvan-
taged representation.
The foregoing analysis provides some purchase on the question of
whether the effects of an accommodation mandate will be felt in wages or in
employment levels. Regardless of the representation of disadvantaged work-
ers in the qualified population, it will be easy to prove wage differentials.
The problem is the difficulty of proving employment differentials. So if dis-
advantaged workers are a small proportion of the qualified population, we
should expect the effects of legal intervention to be felt in employment levels
and not in wages.
3. Occupational segregation.
a. In general.
If there is substantial occupational segregation between disadvantaged
and nondisadvantaged workers, then, in contrast to the preceding section,
restrictions on wage differentials will tend to be of little force. This is so
because the only comparisons that are drawn in the law are those between
workers within the same employment market (or, more technically, those per-
forming the same or similar work, although, of course, both of these concep-
tions are not clear-cut and are subject to manipulation). Thus, if disadvan-
taged and nondisadvantaged workers are significantly concentrated in differ-
ent employment markets, then restrictions on their relative wages will have
limited force.
The primary consequence of occupational segregation is thus that an ac-
commodation mandate will have negative effects on the wages (both abso-
lute and relative) of disadvantaged workers and either positive or negative
consequences on their relative employment levels depending on the value
versus the cost of the mandated accommodation. These conclusions follow
from the discussion in Part I.B.3 above of the scenario in which restrictions
on wage differentials are not binding.
One might object at this point by saying that very few employment mar-
kets are actually perfectly segregated, so that there is absolutely no opportu-
nity to compare disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers' wage levels.
That is of course true; the notion of complete separation of groups, so that
restrictions on wage differentials have no force at all, is a useful heuristic
rather than an exact description of reality. A more exact account is that in
markets with significant segregation, the wage and employment effects of
accommodation mandates will look almost the same if restrictions on wage
and employment differentials are binding as if restrictions on wage differen-
tials are not binding at all.
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To see this important point, consider the case of an employment market
characterized by significant occupational segregation; suppose, for instance,
that ninety-five percent of the workers in this market are from the disadvan-
taged group. (Part II.C.1 below gives many examples of markets with this
sort of occupational segregation.) As noted above, restrictions on wage dif-
ferentials between disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers in the mar-
ket are likely to be enforceable, and, given the size of the disadvantaged
group, restrictions on employment differentials are likely to be as well.
However, because of the small number of nondisadvantaged workers in the
market, there is little potential for shifting costs to those workers even with
binding restrictions on wage and employment differentials. As a result, dis-
advantaged workers will bear the costs of the mandated accommodation, just
as in the analysis of Part I.B.3 above for the case of no binding restrictions
on wage differentials. It is in this sense that the case in which restrictions on
wage differentials are not binding serves as a useful heuristic for analyzing
the effects of accommodation mandates in cases of substantial occupational
segregation.
With regard to whether the effects of an accommodation mandate will be
felt in wages or employment levels, the analysis in Part I.B.3 suggests that
the main effect will be on wages. Indeed, as that analysis shows, the effects
of an accommodation mandate will be felt exclusively in wages, with no re-
duction at all in the employment level, unless the cost of the mandated ac-
commodation exceeds its value.
b. A (brie]) caveat from cognitive psychology.
As just described, a standard economic analysis suggests that in cases of
substantial occupational segregation the effects of an accommodation man-
date will be felt most significantly in wages. However, an argument about
the psychology of employers (or, more accurately, of individual decision-
makers who act on behalf of employers) suggests a possible reason that this
may not be true. Costs that are difficult to monetize-such as the cost of
certain accommodation mandates-may be less likely to be felt in wages and
more likely to be felt in employment levels, at least in the short run before
employment decisionmakers learn ways to monetize these costs. (It is also
possible that hard-to-monetize costs will be ignored completely in decision-
making as a result of their uncertain quality.) Thus, for instance, a require-
ment that employers expend a particular sum on health insurance for par-
ticular employees might be relatively likely to be felt in wages in cases of
occupational segregation, since the cost is easy to monetize (at least in the
case of employers who do not self-insure), but a requirement that employers
permit job sharing, family leave, or the like might be less likely to be felt in
wages, since the costs of these forms of intervention would be harder to
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monetize, at least in the short term before employers have significant experi-
ence with the requirement. Employers thus might respond to a mandate of
job sharing or family leave by reducing employment levels rather than by
reducing wage levels.
Obviously this point would need to be elaborated and developed in a
much fuller way before reaching any definitive conclusions on the basis of it.
The argument is offered here in a highly preliminary way, with the idea of
seeing whether it is consistent with the empirical evidence discussed in Part
II below. As described there, the evidence neither strongly confirms nor
strongly disconfirms the argument based on cognitive psychology.
4. The effect of accommodation mandates on occupational segregation.
The discussion until now has focused on the role of occupational segre-
gation in determining the effects of accommodation mandates. This ap-
proach assumes a conventional attribution of the level of occupational segre-
gation to a combination of supply-side and demand-side factors, including
sex-based occupational preferences on the supply side and various forms of
discriminatory behavior on the demand side.93 (The point about discrimina-
tory behavior suggests that nonbinding restrictions on employment differen-
tials may cause, as well as merely accompany, occupational segregation.)
But the analysis offered here suggests an additional factor that may affect the
level of occupational segregation. Accommodation mandates, if imposed in
markets with binding restrictions on wage differentials (which would neces-
sarily, by the analysis offered above, be markets without significant occupa-
tional segregation initially), will themselves create pressure for increased
segregation of those markets. This can happen in two ways.94
First, in employment markets with binding restrictions on wage but not
employment differentials, accommodation mandates will produce negative
employment effects for disadvantaged workers, as described in Part I.B.2
above. If the workers displaced from the previously integrated markets be-
come concentrated in newly "disadvantaged heavy" markets, then the man-
date will have produced an increase in occupational segregation.
Second, in employment markets with binding restrictions on both wage
and employment differentials, nondisadvantaged workers will be paid less
than their total marginal revenue product of labor after the imposition of the
mandate, and disadvantaged workers will be paid more than their total mar-
93. See Blau et al., supra note 86, at 31 (describing possible supply-side and demand-side
factors).
94. For another argument that accommodation mandates may increase segregation, see Ruhm,
Parental Leave Mandates, supra note 9, at 288 (citing an account of the Swedish experience).
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ginal revenue product of labor, all as described in Part I.B.1.b. This situation
would create pressure on the composition of the employment market: non-
disadvantaged workers would have an incentive to leave, and disadvantaged
workers would have an incentive to enter. Nondisadvantaged workers would
prefer employment markets without binding restrictions on wage and em-
ployment differentials (in other words, segregated markets) and, although
this would be less ideal from their perspective, they would also prefer inte-
grated employment markets with fewer disadvantaged workers to subsidize.
Disadvantaged workers, by contrast, would have the opposite incentives. So
the mandate itself would tend to cause an increase in occupational segrega-
tion, as the formerly unsegregated market would tend to become more and
more concentrated with disadvantaged workers.
Empirically, the critical question would be how easy such employment
market switches are for workers, given their preexisting training, human
capital investments, and other factors. In addition, a complete analysis of
such market switching would have to take into account the resulting wage
changes that would occur in the various markets with inflows or outflows of
workers. A comprehensive analysis of these effects is beyond the scope of
the present inquiry. The important point for present purposes is simply that,
along with the usual supply-side and demand-side factors used to explain
occupational segregation, accommodation mandates may have at least a sec-
ond-order effect on segregation in certain markets. It is therefore possible
that a market that initially appeared to have binding restrictions on wage dif-
ferentials might, as a consequence of an accommodation mandate and the
resulting increase in segregation, begin to behave like a market without such
binding restrictions.
Table 2 below summarizes the circumstances under which restrictions on
wage and employment differentials are likely to be binding or nonbinding
given the initial level of occupational integration or segregation in the em-
ployment market in question. Together with Table 1, this table will prove
helpful in generating the empirical predictions offered in Part II below.
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Table 2
Binding or Nonbinding Restrictions on Wage and Employment
Differentials
Scenario Restrictions on Restrictions on
wage differen- employment
tials differentials
Occupational Disadvantaged work- Binding Binding
integration ers comprise a rela-
tively large propor-
tion of the qualified
labor pool
Disadvantaged work- Binding Nonbinding
ers comprise a rela-
tively small propor-
tion of the qualified
labor pool
Occupational Costs of mandated Nonbinding Nonbinding
segregation accommodation are
easy to monetize




The framework developed in Part I can be used to generate testable pre-
dictions about the wage and employment effects of specific accommodation
mandates. This Part generates such predictions about each of the accommo-
dation mandates described in the Introduction: the requirement of reasonable
accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); the state
law requirements that health insurance plans provide coverage for maternity-
related hospital and medical expenses if they provide general hospital and
medical coverage; and the requirement under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) that employees be given unpaid leave in the event that they
have a serious health condition or a newborn or newly adopted child or a
family member who is ill.
The predictions generated for each of these accommodation mandates
can then be tested against the existing empirical evidence on the effects of
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the particular mandate. As described below, the empirical evidence matches
up well with the analytic predictions generated by Part I's framework.
Two preliminary methodological points are important here. The first
relates to a difference in scope between the analytic framework developed in
Part I and the empirical data presented here. As described in Part I.A.2.a, the
supply and demand framework used here is for a given employment mar-
ket-for instance, the market for entry-level clerical workers in a given geo-
graphic region. The empirical data, by contrast, are typically aggregate, cov-
ering employment markets as a whole. The data look at how a given man-
date affects all workers within a given group (for instance, disabled workers
in the case of the ADA), not simply how it affects workers in that group
within a given employment market. Empirical work of the sort on which I
rely here generally cannot be done for individual employment markets, since
only large sample sizes allow one to test the effects of the legal doctrines at
suitable levels of statistical significance. What this means, however, is that
the highly aggregated empirical data may gloss over significant variations
across individual employment markets. What the empirical data show is
what is happening in most employment markets, not necessarily what is hap-
pening in each and every individual market.
The second methodological point relates to the parsimony of the Sum-
mers model and, correspondingly, the framework developed in Part I. As
noted above, the Summers model adopts a number of simplifying assump-
tions; certain contextual factors that may characterize some real-world em-
ployment markets and some legal doctrines may not be fully captured in the
framework. The question addressed in this Part is whether the modified ver-
sion of this framework offered here nonetheless generates predictions that
are generally confirmed by the data. This is simply an application of the
general economic method, which calls for starting with a parsimonious
model and seeing if it adequately explains observed patterns of evidence.
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Analysis.
The ADA creates a protected class of individuals who have an "impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more ... major life activities," have a
record of such an impairment, or are regarded as having such an impair-
ment.95 The ADA protects this class of disabled individuals through a re-
quirement of "reasonable accommodation," which an employer must provide
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
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unless doing so would pose an "undue hardship."96 Reasonable accommo-
dation may entail "physical modifications to a work space, flexible schedul-
ing of duties, or provision of assistive technologies to aid in job perform-
ance."97
What will the wage and employment effects of the ADA's reasonable
accommodation mandate be? Under the framework developed in Part I, a
critical factor in determining these effects is the degree to which restrictions
on wage and employment differentials between disabled and nondisabled
workers will be binding. If such restrictions are binding, then the accommo-
dation mandate will leave unchanged or increase the relative wages of dis-
abled workers and will be likely to increase these workers' relative employ-
ment levels (see Part I.B.l.c above).
At least some of the gains to disabled workers from the ADA with bind-
ing restrictions on wage and employment differentials in place would come
at the expense of nondisadvantaged (nondisabled) workers in the same em-
ployment market, as described more fully in Part I.B.l.b. Sherwin Rosen
argues that the nondisabled workers in the employment markets containing
the greatest number of disabled workers are disproportionately likely to be
unskilled workers.98 Rosen's argument suggests the possibility that the ADA
inappropriately places the burden of employing and accommodating the dis-
abled on the shoulders of unskilled workers. This is an interesting and con-
ceptually important idea (assuming the underlying empirical premise about
disabled workers' relative representation in unskilled employment markets is
correct), but I do not think it is practically significant, since the scenario in
which there are binding restrictions on both wage and employment differen-
tials between disabled and nondisabled workers is unlikely to obtain in prac-
tice.
The reason it is unlikely to obtain in practice is not that binding restric-
tions on wage differentials are unlikely to exist. This would occur with
large-scale occupational segregation of disabled and nondisabled individuals,
as described in Part I.D.3.a above. But it is not the case that some employ-
ment markets are populated heavily or exclusively by disabled individuals
while others are populated heavily or exclusively by nondisabled individuals;
rather, all (or virtually all) employment markets are populated heavily or ex-
clusively by nondisabled individuals, simply because disabled individuals are
a relatively small proportion of the overall labor force, as argued more fully
96. Id. § 12112(a), (b)(5).
97. Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Part I- Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAuL L. REv. 877, 892 (1997).
98. Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND
WORK, supra note 14, at 18, 27, 29.
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just below. (And, indeed, a premise of Rosen's argument is that disabled and
nondisabled workers are found in the same employment markets.)
Rather the issue is that there are unlikely to be binding restrictions on
employment differentials between disabled and nondisabled workers. The
reason is that, as noted in Part I.D.2 above, it is generally quite difficult for
disadvantaged workers to establish that they were unlawfully refused em-
ployment by an employer. Also as noted in Part I.D.2, the difficulty is par-
ticularly acute when the disadvantaged group is relatively small. In the case
of disabled workers, the Supreme Court has recently made clear its reluc-
tance to expand the size of the overall class of disabled individuals.99
Moreover, and more importantly, an individual with a particular disability
might well have to show a disparity between the employer's workforce and
the qualified population with respect to that disability, not "disability" in
general. A contrary approach could encourage "cream-skimming" by em-
ployers, since by hiring a sufficiently large number of people with relatively
less serious disabilities they could immunize themselves against challenges
by rejected individuals with more serious disabilities.100 A possible response
to this problem would be to allow employees to show disparities using the
broader pool of all disabled individuals while forbidding employers to de-
fend their employment practices by using this pool, but existing law does not
provide any precedent for using different pools depending on whether the use
is "offensive" or "defensive." The difficulty of making out a statistical claim
in the disability context may explain the rarity of such claims in practice.
The hypothesis offered here is therefore that binding restrictions on wage
differentials between disabled and nondisabled individuals are likely to exist
(since this is not a case of high occupational segregation), but binding re-
strictions on employment differentials are not likely to exist. In this sce-
nario, the ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate is predicted to in-
crease or leave unchanged the relative wages of disabled workers while de-
creasing their relative employment levels, as explained in Part I.B.2.b.
The one exception to these predictions concerns the category of purely
fixed-cost accommodations. As described in Part I.A.2.a, the supply and
demand framework used here assumes that there is some incremental cost,
correlated with the employment level, of a mandate in addition to any fixed
99. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,484-87 (1999). Of course, with a more
expansive definition of the class, establishing employment differentials would be easier, but at the
same time the opportunity for distributive gains, even with binding restrictions on wage and em-
ployment differentials, would be smaller, as the analysis in Part I.B.l.b above reveals.
100. Cf. Richard V. Burkhauser, Robert H. Haveman & Barbara L. Wolfe, How People with
Disabilities Fare when Public Policies Change, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251, 264-65
(1993) ("[The ADA] may stimulate the employment of some people with disabilities via 'creaming'
of those workers with the least-serious disabilities .... ").
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cost it may entail. Thus, under my framework, each disadvantaged worker
hired creates new costs for the employer. Where the mandated accommoda-
tion in question is, say, a reader for a blind employee, this framework clearly
makes sense. However, in the case of accommodations with no incremental
cost, such as a wheelchair ramp or a lower sink in an employee kitchen, the
framework would not apply. Such accommodations entail a one-time cost,
and thus an employer would not have any disincentive, as a result of the ac-
commodation mandate, to hire disabled workers once the one-time cost had
been incurred. Therefore, in this particular setting, the negative relative em-
ployment effects predicted here may not arise. However, as already noted,
the empirical evidence on the effects of mandates is at an aggregate level,
and the overall or aggregate prediction remains that the ADA will cause
negative relative employment effects but no negative relative wage effects
for disabled workers.
Are the predictions offered here consistent with the evidence?
2. Empirical evidence.
a. Basic results.
The most comprehensive study of the empirical effects of the ADA to
date is due to M.I.T. economists Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist, who
compare wages and employment levels of disabled and nondisabled workers
before and after the ADA went into effect.0o Acemoglu and Angrist find
that the wages of disabled workers exhibited no change relative to those of
nondisabled workers, while employment levels fell significantly for disabled
workers aged 21-39 relative to nondisabled workers in this same age co-
hort.102 (They also find a significant decrease in employment levels for dis-
abled men aged 40-58 relative to nondisabled men in this same age cohort,
but the decline may be explained by increases in federal disability benefits
receipts.03 Acemoglu and Angrist find no effect at all on the employment
levels of disabled women aged 40-58 relative to those of nondisabled women
in this same age cohort.104) Acemoglu and Angrist's results are similar to
those discovered by Thomas DeLeire, who finds that the ADA had no nega-
tive effect on the relative wages of male disabled workers and a significant
101. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 14.
102. See id. at 12-13.
103. See id. at 12-13, 17-18.
104. See id. at 12-13.
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negative effect on the relative employment levels of these workers (with no
distinctions across age groups).105
These results are consistent with the predictions generated above. The
relative wages of disabled workers stayed the same, while their relative em-
ployment levels fell in some or all instances. By contrast, if restrictions on
both wage and employment differentials were binding, as Rosen's analysis of
the ADA assumes, then the relative wages of disabled workers would stay
the same or rise (consistent with the empirical evidence), but the relative em-
ployment levels of these workers would be likely to rise (contrary to the em-
pirical evidence). Meanwhile, if neither restrictions on wage differentials
nor restrictions on employment differentials were binding, then the relative
wages of disabled workers would fall, again contrary to the empirical evi-
dence.
b. Discussion.
The empirical evidence of declines in relative disabled employment lev-
els in the wake of the ADA presents somewhat of a puzzle in light of prior
data suggesting that the costs of accommodation of disability in the work-
place are fairly modest.106 If those prior studies are correct, then the reduc-
tion in relative disabled employment in the wake of the ADA may result
from the costs of other aspects of the ADA rather than from its requirement
of reasonable accommodation (which should not have much effect if the
usual cost of accommodation is truly modest). Elsewhere I develop more
systematically the effects of the ADA's other provisions-in particular, its
prohibitions on differential treatment of disabled workers and on practices
that have a disparate impact on such workers;107 Acemoglu and Angrist also
offer a related discussion.108 Of course, it is also possible, or even likely, that
the studies suggesting modest costs of accommodation are inaccurate; this
could be true for a host of reasons, including that only relatively inexpensive
accommodations may have been provided (and thus captured by the studies)
105. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 J. HUM. REsouRcEs (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 11-15, on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
106. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabili-
ties, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 322-23 (2000) (summarizing data on the costs of ac-
commodation).
107. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation 11-17, 44-52 (2000) (working
paper, on file with author).
108. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 14, at 7-10.
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and that measuring many indirect costs of accommodation is likely to be ex-
tremely difficult.109
Assuming, however, that the effects of the ADA are due at least in part
to its reasonable accommodation mandate, it is critical to note that the reduc-
tion in disabled workers' relative employment levels does not in any way
suggest that the reasonable accommodation mandate is inefficient in the
sense that the value of accommodation to disabled workers falls short of its
cost to employers. As emphasized in Part I.B.2 above, with binding restric-
tions on wage but not employment differentials, the absolute and relative
employment levels of disadvantaged workers will fall regardless of the
value-cost relationship. This point is particularly pertinent in the context of
the ADA because of the suggestion of some courts that only when the value
of the proposed accommodation exceeds, or at least does not fall signifi-
cantly short of, its cost may the accommodation qualify as "reasonable"
within the meaning of the statute. 10
c. Caveats about the empirical evidence.
One possible objection to the empirical evidence of negative relative
employment effects discussed above is that the category of "disabled" work-
ers is not properly defined. In Acemoglu and Angrist's study, and also in
DeLeire's work, the definition of a "disabled" worker is based on individu-
als' responses to a government survey question about disability status. For
instance, Acemoglu and Angrist identify disabled workers by the question,
"Does [the individual] have a health problem or a disability which prevents
him/her from working or which limits the kind or amount of work he/she can
do?""' An affirmative answer to this question clearly does not map per-
fectly onto the ADA's definition of disability.112 Someone could give a
negative answer to the question yet be disabled within the meaning of the
ADA (for instance, a person with asymptomatic 1HV113), and, conversely,
someone could give an affirmative answer and yet not be disabled within the
meaning of the statute (for instance, someone whose poor vision precludes
109. See Thomas N. Chirikos, Will the Costs of Accommodating Workers with Disabilities
Remain Low? 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 93, 94 (1999) (recognizing the possibility of a cost-skewed
sample of accommodations); Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1672, 1677 (2000) (noting the problem of cost-skewed samples and the difficulty of measur-
ing "soft" costs of accommodation).
110. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir.
1995).
111. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 14, at 10.
112. Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 12, at 299-300.
113. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that such a person is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA).
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certain jobs in the transportation industry' 14). But it seems clear that the sur-
vey question measures something sufficiently related to the actual definition
of disability under the ADA to be telling us something meaningful about the
effects of the statute. In other words, if we learn that those who answer
"yes" to the survey question experienced reduced relative employment levels
and no reduction in relative wage levels in the aftermath of the ADA, we
learn at least something about the effects of the law.
Definitional issues aside, a general problem with time series evidence
such as that offered by Acemoglu and Angrist and by DeLeire is that other
things relevant to the relative employment situation of disabled workers may
have changed at the same time that the ADA went into effect. This makes it
difficult to be certain that the changes in the relative employment situation of
disabled workers resulted from the ADA rather than from these other factors.
Acemoglu and Angrist offer several tests to distinguish between the effects
of the ADA and the effects of other forces. First, they control for increases
in federal disability benefits receipts, since such increases could obviously
cause reductions in disabled employment levels if some individuals would no
longer work with more generous benefit levels., is Second, they examine the
change in the relative employment levels of disabled workers at small firms
(many of which are not subject to the ADA) relative to medium-sized firms
that are both subject to the ADA and likely to have relatively high compli-
ance costs (compared to still larger firms), and they find that the employment
declines are greater at the medium-sized firms.116 Third, Acemoglu and An-
grist examine reductions in the relative employment levels of disabled work-
ers in states with a large number of ADA-related discrimination charges ver-
sus reductions in their relative employment levels in states with fewer such
charges, and they find much larger reductions in the former states." 7 It
should be noted in connection with this last point, however, that variation in
charge levels may be an endogenous "policy" variable rather than a variable
that is exogenous to the outcome of interest (relative employment levels of
disabled workers).118 If it is not exogenous, then this third test will have less
force. But the first and second tests still point to the same conclusion.
114. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that such a person is
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
115. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 14, at 16-18. For a more detailed analysis of the
effects of federal disability benefits on disabled employment levels, see JOHN BOUND & TIMOTHY
XVAIDMANN, ACCOUNTING FOR RECENT DECLINES IN EMPLOYMENT RATES AMONG THE
WORKING-AGED DISABLED (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7975, 2000).
116. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 14, at 20-21.
117. Seeid. at 21-22.
118. See Kenneth Y. Chay, The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy on Black Economic
Progress: Evidence from the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 51 INDuS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 608, 612 & n.5 (1998) (making an analogous point about Title VII).
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One possibility that Acemoglu and Angrist fail to consider is that the
ADA may produce negative relative employment effects for disabled work-
ers for a reason quite distinct from whatever costs the law's accommodation
mandate imposes. The ADA's protection of disabled workers may encour-
age greater human capital investments (hence greater time spent in school),
and greater particularity about job matches, among this group. The relative
employment level of disabled workers could therefore drop as a result of the
ADA wholly apart from the costs imposed by the law's accommodation
mandate.
3. Normative ramifications (briefly).
The analytic predictions and empirical evidence described above obvi-
ously raise potentially troubling normative issues about the ADA. If the law
reduces the relative employment levels of disabled workers for reasons at
least in part independent of increased human capital investment or more par-
ticularity about job matches (the last point raised above), then is the ADA
undesirable, and should it be abandoned? A full answer to this question
would obviously require extended discussion and would take me far afield
from the central purposes of the present inquiry, which are quite distinct
from that normative issue. However, this short section will briefly describe
some possible responses to the negative relative employment effects that the
ADA appears to produce. The discussion assumes, without defending the
assumption here, that such effects are undesirable in the sense that if accom-
modation of disability could be achieved without them, this would be the
better outcome.
One reform, frequently advocated by commentators, would be to replace
the ADA's accommodation mandate with a subsidy scheme encouraging
employers to employ (and compensating them for employing) disabled
workers.119 Such a scheme would be structurally similar to the sort of sub-
sidy-and-fine systems that Robert Cooter and David Strauss have suggested
as potential alternatives to the existing legal regime governing discrimination
on the basis of race and (in the case of Cooter) sex.120 However, if one is
troubled by the idea of a subsidy-type scheme in the context of race or sex
discrimination-as many people are, on grounds of stigma and symbol-
119. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 42, at 493-94.
120. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 144-49
(1994); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The
Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1654-56 (1991).
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ism121-then the subsidy alternative to the ADA may be similarly troubling,
since it may similarly stigmatize its intended beneficiaries. As well, a sub-
sidy system may lack the political durability of a rights-based regime such as
the ADA.122 At the same time, some subsidy-type options, particularly those
that involve direct government aid with workplace accommodations (such as
readers for the blind) as opposed to cash payments to employers, might not
be stigmatizing or otherwise symbolically objectionable. Moreover, given
the historical precedent for government aid to the disabled, such subsidies
might fare well on political durability grounds.
A different alternative to the current regime would be to preserve the
ADA's accommodation mandate while significantly increasing the damages
available for violations of its restrictions on hiring differentials.123" This
change would obviously improve employers' incentives to conform to the
hiring restrictions. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and
punitive damages are potentially available in ADA actions but are subject to
caps that vary with the size of the firm.124 Available damages range from
$50,000 for firms with 100 or fewer employees to $300,000 for firms with
more than 500 employees;125 even the $300,000 cap is far smaller than the
damages in many successful tort actions.126 Moreover, there are special lim-
its on the availability of damages in cases that involve issues of reasonable
accommodation.27 Changing these restrictive rules in the context of claims
of hiring discrimination could help to improve the degree to which the
ADA's restrictions on hiring differentials effectively constrain employers'
behavior. Such a strategy could be usefully complemented by attending to
the incentives and operations of institutions (such as government actors and
public-interest organizations) devoted to protecting employees' legal rights
and to ways to enhance such institutions' effectiveness.28 Of course, en-
121. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 47-64 (1992); John J. Donohue III, Discrimination in Employment, in I THE NEWv
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 615, 619 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
122. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19,36 (2000).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(1)-(4), (6)-(7) (1994).
124. See id. § 1981a(a)(2), (b)(3).
125. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
126. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding a $3.1
million verdict on a tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by an em-
ployee).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (1994).
128. See generally Christine Jolls, The Role and Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organi-
zations in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Richard B. Freeman, Lawrence Mischel, Joni Hersch & Elaine Bernard
eds., forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review) (discussing employee-side
representation by public-interest organizations).
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hancing the penalties for hiring differentials would impose various sorts of
administrative and other costs at the same time.129
A third possible approach to the negative relative employment effects
that appear to be associated with the ADA would be to relax the legal re-
strictions on wage differentials imposed by the law. In that case the ADA
would no longer protect disabled workers from wage reductions in response
to the law's accommodation mandate, but the ability of wages to adjust
would reduce employers' incentive to refuse to employ disabled individuals
in the first place. If wage reductions for disabled workers are thought to be
less troubling than employment losses, then this change might be a desirable
one. But such a view is contestable; John L. Lewis of the United Mine
Workers of America famously claimed that it is "better to have half a million
men working... at good wages... than it is to have a million working...
in poverty."130 By the same token it might be regarded as better to have
fewer disabled workers employed without wage adjustments than to have
more employed at lower wages. But even assuming that wage adjustments
are thought to be preferable to employment adjustments, the fact of the mat-
ter is that nonlegal as well as legal forces generally operate to curtail wage
differences in employment markets, as described above.131 As a result the
relaxation of legal restrictions on wage differentials would probably have
relatively little practical effect.
B. State Law Requirements Governing Health Insurance Plans
1. Analysis.
a. Basic predictions.
As noted in the Introduction, some states require health insurance com-
panies to include coverage of maternity-related hospital and medical ex-
penses in their plans when general hospital and medical coverage is pro-
vided.132 (Such coverage is likely to be independently required for em-
ployer-provided health insurance under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978 (PDA);133 elsewhere I describe the relationship between the PDA and
129. See, e.g., Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, supra note 12, at 514-16
(describing costs of antidiscrimination provisions).
130. CHARLES R. PERRY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE DECLINE OF THE UNITED
MINE WORKERS 104 (1984) (citing JOSEPH E. FINLEY, THE CORRUPT KINGDOM: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS 61 (1972)).
131. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 5 supra (citing state statutes).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). See, e.g., Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-79 (1983); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the
[Vol. 53:223
HeinOnline -- 53 Stan. L. Rev. 282 2000-2001
ACCOMMODATION MANDATES
accommodation mandates in greater detail.134) To the extent that employers
procure health insurance from companies covered by these state laws, such
requirements operate as mandates that accommodate the special needs of
female employees of childbearing age. Many states presumably would also
like to be able to regulate the plans provided by employers who self-insure
instead of purchasing coverage through insurance companies, but such regu-
lation is preempted by the federal Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 135 which tends to be more limited in its substantive regulation
of health insurance plans than are state statutes. 36 As of 1998, fifty percent
of all insured workers were enrolled in self-insured plans exempt from state
mandates.t37
What will the wage and employment effects of the state health insurance
accommodation mandates be? Again, a critical factor will be the degree to
which binding restrictions on wage and employment differentials between
disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers (here, females and males of
childbearing age) exist.
Female and male workers "are to a considerable degree segregated in
differentjobs."38 In quantitative terms, using 1990 data, approximately half
of workers of one sex or the other would have to change occupations (for
example, from male-dominated to female-dominated, or vice-versa) for the
occupational distributions of men and women to be the same.' 39 In addition,
these statistics, based on data from the Census, are likely to underestimate
the full extent of occupational segregation because of the limited specificity
of the occupational categories used by the Census. It is possible that a Cen-
sus category appears integrated, but this may disguise significant segregation
across jobs within that category. 140
In light of this substantial occupational segregation by sex, restrictions
on wage differentials are likely to have limited force, as described in Part
I.D.3.a above. Thus, the relative wages of female workers should fall with
the imposition of the mandate, and their relative employment levels should
rise or fall depending on whether the value of the mandated accommodation
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 347-49
(1984-1985).
134. Jolls, supra note 107, at 13-25, 29-30.
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,747 & n.25 (1985); WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 43, at 851.
136. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 43, at 843-44.
137. Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and
Mandated Benefit Laws, 77 MILBANK Q. 425,426 (1999).
138. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Institutions and Laws in the Labor Market, in
3A HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1399, 1439 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).
139. See Blau et al., supra note 86, at 33-34 & tbl.1.
140. Id. at 54.
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exceeds or falls short of its cost, all as described in Part I.B.3.b. If value ex-
ceeds (or equals) cost, the relative employment level of female workers will
not fall at all; rather, the whole effect of the intervention will be felt in
wages.
One caveat to these conclusions concerns the case of a binding minimum
wage. In that scenario the effects of an accommodation mandate will be felt
in employment levels rather than wages, even with high levels of occupa-
tional segregation. The reason is simple: there is no room for wages to ad-
just downward. This might explain press reports that a newly enacted mater-
nity leave law in Brazil reduced the hiring of women even in traditionally
female occupations such as low-level office work, hotel staff, and cleaning
services.141 Particularly in the case of employment markets covered by "liv-
ing wage" ordinances, wage adjustments may simply not be feasible.42
However, the empirical evidence described below suggests that the minimum
wage qualifier does not turn out to be significant in practice.
The analysis of wage and employment effects offered here helps to shed
light on the longstanding debate over whether accommodation mandates di-
rected to female workers-such as the requirement that maternity-related
hospital and medical expenses be covered in health insurance plans if general
hospital and medical coverage is provided-are or are not akin to the "pro-
tective" legislation that applied to these workers earlier in the century (for
instance, limitations on their work hours).143 The economic framework de-
veloped in Part I reveals that one cannot sensibly analyze this question with-
out first understanding the degree to which restrictions on wage and em-
ployment differentials between female and male workers are likely to bind.
Whether legal intervention helps or hurts the accommodated group, and to
what degree, will depend critically on this factor. The analysis above sug-
gests that restrictions on wage differentials frequently will not bind for fe-
male workers, as a result of occupational segregation, and, thus, that accom-
modation mandates targeted to female workers will be likely to be financed
by those same workers primarily in the form of lower wages. This is not to
suggest a complete similarity with the old-style protective legislation; that
legislation was based on stereotyped views of women's abilities and capaci-
141. See Marlise Simons, Brazil Women Find Fertility May Cost Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1988, at All (describing reduced hiring of women).
142. For examples of communities with such ordinances, see Craig L. Briskin & Kimberly A.
Thomas, The Waging of Welfare: All Work and No Pay?, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 589 &
n.179 (1998), and Gregory D. Squires, Sally O'Connor, Michael Grover & James Walrath, Housing
Affordability in the Milwaukee Metropolitan Area: A Matter of Income, Race, and Policy, J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L., Fall 1999, at 34,41.
143. For discussions of this debate, see, for example, Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note
15, at 2172-79; Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 952-55 (1985); and Williams, supra note 133, at 371-72, 376-77.
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ties rather than brute scientific facts such as that it is women who give birth
to biological children. The point, however, is that the two forms of legal in-
tervention are similar in terms of ostensibly "protecting" women, but doing
so to women's detriment in terms of their position in employment markets.
A complicating factor in the analysis of the effects of accommodation
mandates in the health insurance context is that it is not only the employee
who may affect health plan costs but also the employee's spouse, who may
be covered under the plan. Thus, while an accommodation mandate relating
to health insurance plans imposes costs associated with female employees, it
may also impose costs associated with male employees to the extent that
those employees' spouses are covered by the plan. But this effect seems
likely to be weaker than the direct effect related to female employees. (Cer-
tainly the empirical evidence discussed below suggests that it is.)
b. Further implications of the shifting of accommodation costs
to wages.
As described above, Part I's framework predicts substantial or exclusive
shifting of the costs of a mandated accommodation of female workers to
these workers' wages. This view contrasts with the analysis offered by
Richard Epstein of mandates that increase the cost of employing female
workers: "[E]mployers will surely have [an] incentive to avoid hiring
women likely to bear children, given the additional costs.., that they will
have to pay."44 Courts and other commentators similarly posit reductions in
female employment as a result of mandates that increase the costs of em-
ploying female workers.145 What these arguments overlook is the possibility
that occupational segregation will mean that costs of employing women may
be significantly or exclusively reflected in wage adjustments, despite the
nominal existence of a legal prohibition on such adjustments. As discussed
below, the empirical evidence supports this possibility. (Both the data dis-
cussed in this section and the data discussed in the following section, relating
to the FMLA and other leave mandates, are relevant here.) This is not to say
that negative employment effects as opposed to negative wage effects for
female workers will occur only rarely or not at all; it is simply to say that
these effects may be less likely than others have suggested.
A corollary prediction stemming from this analysis is that employers will
not be particularly likely to respond to a mandate accommodating female
workers in the health insurance context by eliminating a health insurance
144. EPSTEIN, supra note 42, at 337-38 (emphasis added).
145. See, e.g., Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2000); Debo-
rah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1, 23 (1995).
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plan altogether. Justice Powell voiced a concern along these lines for pen-
sion plans in his dissent in a case146 similar to City of Los Angeles v. Man-
har147; Powell worried that the requirement that employers offer pension
benefits on equal terms to male and female workers, despite the greater aver-
age cost of the latter, would lead employers to curtail their plans entirely (as
in fact the employer had done in that case).148 Richard Epstein has offered
similar arguments about Manhart, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, and the ADA. 149 And Manhart itself addressed the question whether
male workers would withdraw from pension plans, or move to different em-
ployers, in response to the Court's decision. 150
The framework developed in Part I shows that these concerns are likely
to be misplaced or, at a minimum, overstated. For what they overlook is
again the ability of wages to adjust in response to an accommodation man-
date, as a result of the substantial occupational segregation of male and fe-
male workers. If the cost of the mandated accommodation is largely or ex-
clusively absorbed in the lower wages paid to disadvantaged workers, then
the employer has little incentive to drop the benefits plan in response to the
imposition of an accommodation mandate.
2. Empirical evidence.
The foregoing analysis suggests that accommodation mandates requiring
health insurance coverage of maternity-related hospital and medical expenses
should have negative effects on the relative wages of female workers and
either positive or negative effects on these workers' relative employment
levels (depending on the value of the accommodation in relation to its cost).
Are these predictions consistent with the evidence? In a well-known study
published in the American Economic Review, Jonathan Gruber examined the
effects of these mandates.151 As noted above, such state mandates are pre-
empted by ERISA insofar as they attempt to regulate employers who self-
insure, but in the period studied by Gruber (the 1970s), only a very small
proportion of employers self-insured.152
146. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
147. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
148. See Arizona Governing Comm., 463 U.S. at 1095, 1098 & n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
149. See EPSTEIN, supra note 42, at 325-26, 343, 492.
150. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716 n.30 (1978).
151. Gruber, supra note 19.
152. See Jon Gabel, Cindy Jajich-Toth, Gregory de Lissovoy, Thomas Rice & Howard Cohen,
The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1988, at 48, 58 ("In 1975,
an estimated 5 percent of employees were enrolled in self-insured plans.").
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Gruber's study finds that mandating coverage of matemity-related hos-
pital and medical expenses reduced the wages of married women of child-
bearing age relative to the wages of the workers least likely to be affected by
the mandate (workers beyond childbearing age and unmarried male workers
of childbearing age).153 This is consistent with the prediction above. The
relative employment level of married women of childbearing age stayed the
same or rose with the mandate,154 which suggests that the value of the man-
dated accommodation exceeded its cost. Given the magnitude of the cost of
this accommodation,155 it is plausible that the shifting to wages occurred via
cuts in real, but not nominal, wages.
All in all, the results strongly support the prediction that health insurance
mandates requiring coverage of maternity-related hospital and medical ex-
penses will reduce the relative wages of female workers. Moreover, the im-
plication, noted above, that the value of the mandated accommodation ex-
ceeded its cost supports the earlier claim that mandates may sometimes be
necessary even when value exceeds cost. (As Gruber notes, a large number
of health insurance plans did not cover maternity-related hospital and medi-
cal expenses prior to the imposition of a mandate.IS6)
Note that Gruber's study involves the effects of legal changes that oc-
curred in the 1970s.157 Occupational segregation was substantially higher
then than it is now, although, as noted above, it is still quite significant to-
day."5s Nonetheless, the fact that occupational segregation has decreased
over time means it is possible that a health insurance mandate targeted to
female workers today would have effects different from what Gruber finds.
At the same time, segregation decreased by less than a quarter between 1970
and 1990, so a qualitative difference in the results may not be particularly
likely159
A more refined empirical test than Gruber's for the predictions offered
above would look at whether the predicted effects are particularly likely in
the most highly segregated employment markets (as Part I's framework
would suggest). Unfortunately, no such test has been done, presumably be-
cause such a test would not be feasible to implement at conventional levels
153. See Gruber, supra note 19, at 630-31 & tbl.3.
154. See id. at 633 & tbl.4, 637 & tbl.5.
155. See id. at 625.
156. Id. at 623.
157. Id.
158. See Blau et al., supra note 86, at 33-34 & tbl.l (providing figures for 1970, 1980, and
1990).
159. See id. (reporting that the proportion of members of one sex who would have to change
occupations for the occupational distribution of men and women to be the same was 68 percent in
1970 versus 53 percent in 1990).
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of statistical significance. This is an application of the point about aggrega-
tion of employment markets discussed at the beginning of this Part.
3. Normative ramifications (briefly).
As in the ADA context, the analytic predictions and empirical evidence
described above raise difficult normative issues. To the extent that the costs
of mandated health insurance coverage of maternity-related hospital and
medical expenses are fully borne by female workers in the form of reduced
wages, as the above analysis and evidence suggest, such mandates are not
producing any significant distributive gains for female workers. Indeed, as
described in Part I.B.3.a above, the effects of such accommodation mandates
are very similar to the effects of mandates directed to workers as a whole,
which have extremely limited distributive potential. In this setting, an ac-
commodation mandate may make the accommodated workers better off if
the value of the mandated accommodation exceeds its cost, but the distribu-
tive gains are completely tethered to that value-cost gap.
One possible normative implication of this analysis is that if the value of
the mandated accommodation is less than its cost, then the mandate should
not be imposed, since in that circumstance (given nonbinding restrictions on
wage differentials) female workers would be worse off with the mandate in
place. The difficulty with this approach, however, relates to the problems
noted earlier with the concept of worker "value." As described in Part
I.A.2.c, there are many potential limitations on workers' ability to value a
mandated accommodation, and thus the fact that the (perceived) value of the
accommodation falls short of its cost does not necessarily imply that disad-
vantaged workers would be worse off with a mandate in place.
In any event, the broader point would remain that, in the absence of
binding restrictions on wage differentials, any accommodation of female
workers will be fully financed by reductions in their wages. The remainder
of this section discusses possible responses to this fact under the assumption,
not defended here, that the shifting of costs to female wages is undesirable in
the sense that if accommodation could be provided without such shifting,
that would be a better outcome.
As with the ADA, the existing regime could be replaced by a subsidy
scheme under which employers would be compensated for providing the
previously mandated accommodation. However, as in the ADA context, the
subsidy alternative might be problematic on grounds of symbolism and
stigma as well as political durability, although perhaps to a greater or lesser
degree depending on the particular form of the subsidy.160
160. See generally notes 119-122 supra and accompanying text.
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A second alternative discussed in connection with the ADA was in-
creasing the penalties imposed for violations of restrictions on hiring differ-
entials. However, in a market with significant occupational segregation, it is
unclear whether this strategy will help. If the existing segregation results
from supply-side factors, then it will not, since restrictions on wage differen-
tials will continue not to bind, and, as described in Part I.B.3 above, in that
circumstance it is irrelevant whether restrictions on employment differentials
are binding. If, by contrast, the existing segregation results from demand-
side barriers to female employment in male-dominated occupations, then
increasing sanctions for the underlying exclusionary behavior could certainly
have the effect both of increasing female representation in male-dominated
occupations and of facilitating the continued enforcement of restrictions on
hiring differentials in those markets.
A final normative strategy in response to the predictions and empirical
evidence described above would be to broaden antidiscrimination law to em-
brace notions of "comparable worth." In that case the law would regulate
male-female wage differentials across employment markets that are male-
dominated and employment markets that are female-dominated, as it fails to
do today.161 If such a reform were implemented, the situation would be
similar to the case of binding restrictions on wage and employment differen-
tials -with integrated employment markets. Obviously, however, adopting the
comparable worth approach would impose many complexities and create
many costs, a full assessment of which is far beyond the scope of the present
inquiry.162
In some sense, all of the normative suggestions discussed in this section
may be less urgent than the analogous suggestions discussed in the context of
the ADA. As already noted, occupational segregation by sex is decreasing
over time (albeit not rapidly). If the trend to decreased segregation contin-
ues, then restrictions on wage differentials will become more likely to bind
over time. Moreover, since women are a substantially larger group than dis-
abled individuals (particularly when disabled individuals are further catego-
rized by their specific disabilities to avoid the cream-skimming problems
noted in Part II.A. 1 above), restrictions on employment differentials may be
much more likely to bind for female workers than for disabled workers. As a
161. See generally AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing
comparable worth doctrine).
162. Leading contributions to the voluminous literature on comparable worth include Barbara
R. Bergmann, The Economic Case for Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH: NEV
DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 71 (Heidi I. Hartmann ed., 1985); Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P.
Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. Cin. L. REv. 891 (1986);
and Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1728 (1986).
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result, the future may hold a more optimistic picture for accommodation
mandates targeted to female workers, suc as mandated coverage of mater-
nity-related hospital and medical expenses in health insurance plans, than the
current predictions and existing empirical evidence suggest.
C. The Family and Medical Leave Act
1. Analysis.
a. Basic Predictions.
The FMLA, enacted in 1993, provides eligible employees with twelve
weeks of unpaid leave upon the birth or adoption of a child, the serious ill-
ness of the employee, or the serious illness of an immediate family mem-
ber.163 Permitting leave after the birth of a child accommodates the special
needs of female employees of childbearing age, since women who have bio-
logical children will require at least a brief period of time off from work after
a birth to recover from the temporary disability associated with giving birth.
(At least this is true given the current state of medical knowledge and current
views of acceptable risks and discomforts.)
The requirement under the FMLA that workers be given time off in the
event of an adoption or the serious illness of an immediate family member
accommodates those workers who need or wish to take time off in such cir-
cumstances. In today's society such workers may be disproportionately
likely to be women. If this is the case, then the requirement qualifies as an
accommodation mandate. Note, though, that what is being accommodated in
this instance is no longer a matter of physical or medical necessity (at least
under current conditions), but instead is arguably a purely social phenome-
non. 164 Obviously, this difference is potentially important for normative
analysis, but for purposes of the largely positive discussion here it is not par-
ticularly significant.
The requirement that employers give workers time off in the event of the
workers' own serious illness accommodates those individuals who face such
an illness. Since this group will be disproportionately (although of course
not exclusively.) composed of disabled workers, the requirement accommo-
dates the special needs of these workers. (Note that this may be less true for
the observable disabilities on which my analysis focuses than for disabilities
in general, but it is still likely to be true even for the case of observable dis-
163. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1994).
164. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 965-68 (1984) (contrasting biological and socially created differences between men and
women).
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abilities.) Because the FMLA does not contain any "reasonableness" re-
quirement or defense for "undue hardship" (apart from the limited exception
along these lines for employees who are among the highest paid ten percent
of all employees65), the FMLA might entitle a worker to leave even if such
leave were not required as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
What will the wage and employment effects of the FMLA be? With re-
gard to the provisions that accommodate female workers (the first two sets of
provisions discussed above), the discussion of occupational segregation by
sex from the analysis of state health insurance accommodation mandates ap-
plies here as well. As discussed above, with significant occupational segre-
gation the effect of an accommodation mandate will be to lower the relative
wages of disadvantaged workers and to increase or decrease their relative
employment levels depending on whether the value of the mandated accom-
modation exceeds or falls short of its cost.
A caveat to this conclusion, however, relates to the cognitive psychology
argument offered in Part I.D.3.b above. That argument suggests that em-
ployment adjustments may be more likely, and wage adjustments less likely,
if the costs of a mandated accommodation are difficult to monetize. While
the sorts of accommodation mandates discussed in the previous section in-
volved health insurance benefits whose costs were quite clear and tangible to
the non-self-insuring employers governed by the mandates, the cost of un-
paid leave is likely to be far more ambiguous. The employer is not con-
fronted with a specific increase in the cost of its health insurance plan.
Rather it faces the hard-to-monetize disruption of losing an employee tempo-
rarily and having either to replace the employee or to reassign the individ-
ual's tasks to others. 66 For reasons of cognitive psychology, accommoda-
tion mandates that impose such hard-to-monetize costs may be more likely to
be reflected in reductions in the relative employment levels of disadvantaged
workers and less likely to be reflected in reductions in their relative wages,
as described above.
Turning now briefly to the FMLA's accommodation of the needs of dis-
abled workers through the leave requirement for employees with serious ill-
nesses, what are the wage and employment effects likely to be? As dis-
cussed in Part Il.A.1 above, mandates that accommodate disabled workers
are predicted to leave unchanged the relative wages of these workers while
reducing their relative employment levels.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b) (1994).
166. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 2191-92, for a summary of the costs of
short-term leaves for employers.
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b. Further implications of the shifting of accommodation costs
to wages.
As in the discussion of mandates requiring coverage of maternity-related
hospital and medical expenses in health insurance plans, the suggestion that
the effects of the FMLA on female workers will be felt substantially or ex-
clusively in wages rather than employment levels is at odds with views ex-
pressed in the existing literature. For instance, Issacharoff and Rosenblum
write of the FMLA:
By assigning the costs of leave to firms... the FMLA reintroduces an incentive
to discriminate against women at the hiring stage. For example, during testi-
mony in 1989, the House Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations was
told in no uncertain terms: "Faced with mandated parental leave, a business
owner choosing between two qualified candidates--one male and one female-
would be tempted to select the male."1 67
What this account overlooks is that in a situation with substantial occu-
pational segregation, the choice posited here-between a male and a female
candidate-may be the real choice facing employers less often than one
would think. In an occupation such as nursing, elementary school teaching,
hotel cleaning, plumbing, or construction (and obviously the list is much
longer, as noted just below), that choice will rarely occur. And precisely be-
cause there is substantial occupational segregation by sex, the wages of fe-
male workers can bear all or a significant fraction of the cost of the mandated
accommodation. As described below (and also in the previous section), there
is empirical evidence of just such wage responses.
In addition to the empirical evidence of wage rather than employment
level adjustments described above and below, data on the composition of
employment markets show that there are many markets in which a choice
between two candidates of opposite sexes will occur only very rarely. Table
3 below lists all occupations that were at least ninety-five percent female or
ninety-five percent male in 1990. Many more occupations were between
ninety and ninety-five percent female or male at that time.168
167. Id. at 2192 (quoting Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 770 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st
Cong. 102 (1989) (statement of Dr. Earl Hess, U.S. Chamber of Commerce)).
168. See Blau et al., supra note 86, at 61-71 (listing percent female in various years for an
extensive list of occupations).
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Table 3
List of Occupations At Least 95% Female or 95% Male in 1990
Occupation % Female in 1990
Child care workers, except private household 95.6
Receptionists 95.7
Dental assistants 97.1
Child care workers, private household 97.3
Prekindergarten & kindergarten teachers 97.8
Dental hygienists 98.4
Secretaries 98.7
Supervisors, brickmasons, stonemasons, & tile setters 0.7
Business, truck, & stationary engine mechanics 0.9
Heavy equipment mechanics 1.1
Farm equipment mechanics 1.1
Supervisors, carpenters & related workers 1.2
Heating, air conditioning, & refrigerator mechanics 1.3
Brickmasons & stonemasons 1.3
Concrete & terrazzo finishers 1.3
Electrical power installers & repairers 1.4
Sheetmetal duct installers 1.4
Drillers, oil well 1.4
Plumbers, pipefitters, & steamfitters 1.5
Roofers 1.6
Longshore equipment operators 1.6
Excavating & loading machine operators 1.6
Elevator installers & repairers 1.7
Carpenters 1.7
Railroad brake, signal, & switch operators 1.7
Grader, dozer, & scraper operators 1.7
Nov. 2000]
HeinOnline -- 53 Stan. L. Rev. 293 2000-2001
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
Table 3
List of Occupations At Least 95% Female or 95% Male in 1990
(continued)
Occupation % Female in 1990
Small engine repairers 1.8
Automobile mechanics 1.9
Structural metal workers 1.9
Supervisors, plumbers, pipefitters, & steamfitters 2.0
Plasterers 2.0
Operating engineers 2.0
Automobile body & related repairers 2.1
Electricians & power transmission installers 2.2
Carpet installers 2.2
Tile setters, hard & soft 2.3
Hoist & winch operators 2.3
Boilermakers 2.4
Crane & tower operators 2.4
Drywall installers 2.5
Electricians 2.5
Paving, surfacing, & tamping equipment operators 2.5
Drillers, earth 2.5
Firefighting occupations 2.7
Mining machine operators 2.7
Mining occupations, n.e.c. 2.7
Locomotive operating occupations 2.7
Supervisors, firefighting & fire prevention 2.8
Supervisors, construction, n.e.c. 2.8
Ship captain & mates, excluding fishing boats 2.9
Timber cutting & logging occupations 3.0
Captains & other officers, fishing vessels 3.0
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Table 3
List of Occupations At Least 95% Female or 95% Male in 1990
(continued)
Occupation % Female in 1990
Stevedores 3.0
Construction trades, n.e.c. 3.1
Millwrights 3.4
Airplane pilots & navigators 3.5
Supervisors, extractive occupations 3.5
Marine & naval architects 3.7
Sailors & deckhands 3.7
Not specified mechanics & repairers 4.0
Insulation workers 4.0
Construction laborers 4.0
Industrial machinery repairers 4.1
Household appliance & power tool repairers 4.1
Garbage collectors 4.2
Supervisors, forestry & logging workers 4.5
Machinery maintenance occupations 4.5




Welders & cutters 4.7
Motor transport occupations, n.e.c. 4.8
Patternmakers & model makers, metal 4.9
Mechanical controls & valve repairers 5.0
Supervisors, painters, paperhangers, & plasterers 5.0
Source: Francine D. Blau, Patricia Simpson & Deborah Anderson, Con-
tinuing Progress? Trends in Occupational Segregation in the United States
over the 1970s and 1980s, 4 FEMINIST ECON. 29, 61-71 (1998).
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The argument here is of course not that the effect of a mandate such as
the FMLA will never be reflected in reduced employment opportunities
rather than reduced wages for female workers. The claim is simply that this
may not be as likely a consequence as others have implied.
2. Empirical evidence.
a. Effects of the FMLA on disabled workers.
The effects of the FMLA on the relative wages and relative employment
levels of disabled workers may be difficult to disentangle from the effects of
the ADA on these things. The ADA went into effect in 1992 (with applica-
tion to employers with between fifteen and twenty-four employees delayed
until 1994),169 the FMLA in 1993.170 The roughly contemporaneous effec-
tive dates of the two laws make it hard to tell what the effects of each on dis-
abled workers are. Thus it is possible that the empirical studies of the ADA
discussed above may reflect a mix of ADA effects and FMLA effects. To
the extent that this is true, the empirical findings (no reduction in relative
wages, and reductions in relative employment levels)171 are consistent with
the analytic predictions about the FMLA offered above (although it is theo-
retically possible that the FMLA has different empirical consequences that,
however, are swamped by the effects of the ADA).
b. Effects of the FMLA on female workers.
More specific and extensive evidence exists on the effects of the FMLA
on female workers. The most obvious approach, of course, is to examine
female workers' relative wages and relative employment levels in the after-
math of the FMLA, much as the disability studies examined the relative
wages and relative employment levels of disabled workers in the aftermath
of the ADA. Jane Waldfogel takes such an approach.172 She finds no con-
sistent pattern of statistically significant results; many of her estimated coef-
ficients are statistically insignificant, and in some cases where estimates are
significant, they have surprising signs.173 The difficulty with Waldfogel's
empirical approach, however, is that many female workers were entitled (by
state legislation or firm policy) to FMLA-type benefits upon the birth of a
169. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Per-
spectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6
(2000).
170. Waldfogel, supra note 9, at 282.
171. See notes 101-105 supra and accompanying text.
172. Waldfogel, supra note 9, at 283.
173. See id. at 294-99.
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child even prior to the FMLA's enactment.1 74 Coverage may have increased
even further With the FMLA,175 but the existence of pre-FMLA policies cov-
ering many female Workers makes it harder to discern the effects of the law.
Indeed, it is not even clear that female leave-taking after the birth or adoption
of a child increased in any clear way after the FMLA's enactment. Waldfo-
gel offers some evidence of an increase, 76 but Christopher Ruhm suggests a
variety of difficulties with Waldfogel's evidence.177 Probably for similar
reasons, Jacob Alex Klerman and Arleen Leibowitz's study of earlier state-
level leave mandates fails to uncover (with one exception noted below178)
statistically significant relationships between the mandates and either leave-
taking behavior or employment levels of female workers with infants com-
pared to a control group of female workers with older children.179
A potentially more reliable test of the effects of a requirement such as
the FMLA's mandate of parental leave comes from looking at the effects of
European laws mandating leave after the birth of a child. The leading study
in this area, published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, is by Christo-
pher Ruhm.S0 Ruhm examines the effects of laws that mandate paid paren-
tal leave, which in practice is taken almost exclusively by female workers.181
174. See ROBERTA M. SPALTER-ROTH & HEIDI I. HARTMANN, UNNECESSARY LOSSES:
COSTS TO AMERICANS OF THE LACK OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 3-6 & tbl.I (1990); Michael
Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 407-10
(1999); Waldfogel, supra note 9, at 282.
175. See Jane Waldfogel, Family Leave Coverage in the 1990s, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct.
1999, at 13, 14-20.
176. See Waldfogel, supra note 9, at 289-94.
177. Ruhm notes:
1) mhe coefficients are frequently estimated imprecisely ... ; 2) the growth in maternity
leave is generally greater for persons working for large (500 or more employees) than medium
(100-499 employees) employers, even though the smaller companies less frequently voluntar-
ily provide[d] leave benefits [prior to the FMLA]; and 3) there is no consistent indication that
the FMLA had a larger effect in states without than in those with pre-existing maternity leave
mandates.
Ruhm, Policy Watch, supra note 9, at 184.
178. See note 187 infra and accompanying text.
179. See Jacob Alex Klerman & Arleen Leibowitz, Labor Supply Effects of State Maternity
Leave Legislation, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 55, at 65, 79
(finding no significant effect of leave mandates on leave-taking); id. at 81 (finding no significant
effect of leave mandates on leave-taking or employment levels).
Ruhm claims that Klerman and Leibowitz's "main results" are increases in leave-taking and
employment levels, see Ruhm, Policy Watch, supra note 9, at 181 tbl.1, but those results come from
specifications that fail to use a control group and thus are subject to problems that Klerman and
Leibowitz describe and that Lawrence Katz reiterates. See Kerman & Leibowitz, supra, at 79
(explaining reasons for using women with older children as a control group); Lawrence F. Katz,
Commentary on Chapter 3, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 55, at
86, 87 (stating that the control-group results are "more methodologically convincing").
180. Ruhm, Parental Leave Mandates, supra note 9.
181. Id. at 286.
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Although the leave is paid, the government covers most or all of the wage
costs,182 so the only (or main) cost to employers is the same as the cost under
the FMLA: the disruption in operations and the need to rely on temporary
replacements or substitutes among the existing workforce. (Given the lim-
ited nature of this cost, it is plausible, as in the case of the Gruber study de-
scribed above, that any wage shifting that occurs is accomplished through
cuts in real but not nominal wages.)183
Ruhm finds that mandated leave is negatively related to the relative
wages of female workers and positively related to their relative employment
levels.184 These results are exactly what the analysis above predicted. Note
that because workers' leave is paid, in contrast to the situation under the
FMLA, it is possible that Ruhm's positive employment effects would not
carry over to the FMLA, which would presumably be valued less by workers
because of the unpaid nature of the leave. But the critical point for present
purposes is that the mandate makes itself felt significantly in wages, and
there is no reason to think that this result would not apply in the FMLA con-
text as well.
Ruhm's results are robust across a range of specifications.'85 The only
exception is that the effect of having some mandated leave versus none, as
distinguished from the effect of having a short mandated leave versus a long
mandated leave, has no statistically significant effect (rather than a statisti-
cally significant negative effect) on relative wages of female workers.186
This may result from the fact that a short leave, as opposed to a long leave,
imposes relatively few costs on employers, and thus provides little occasion
for a wage adjustment. As with the Gruber study, it would be ideal to test
whether Ruhm's results are strongest in the employment markets with the
greatest levels of occupational segregation, but the sample sizes are very
likely too small.
Ruhm's results do not confirm the prediction based on cognitive psy-
chology that the effects of difficult-to-monetize mandates, such as the
FMLA, will be felt in employment levels rather than in wages; his results
instead support the traditional model of wage rather than employment effects
in cases of occupational segregation. On the other hand, Klerman and Lei-
bowitz find a statistically significant negative effect of recently enacted (at
the time of their study) state leave mandates on the employment levels of
women with infants compared to a control group of women with older chil-
182. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 2214; Ruhm, Parental Leave Mandates,
supra note 9, at 289-90.
183. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
184. See Ruhm, Parental Leave Mandates, supra note 9, at 303-05 & tbl.IV.
185. See id. at 305-07 & tbl.V.
186. See id. at 307-09 & tbl.VI.
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dren.187 It is possible that parental leave mandates are reflected in wage ad-
justments in European countries that have long experience with such inter-
ventionla8 (and hence where employers may be more capable of monetizing
the costs of the intervention) but are reflected in employment level adjust-
ments in the United States, where such intervention is newer and less famil-
iar. On the other hand, the difference between Ruhm's results and those of
Klerman and Leibowitz may simply reflect the difficulty of teasing out the
effects of parental leave mandates. (The latter possibility is given weight by
the fact that an earlier, albeit more preliminary, study by Ruhm and Jackque-
line Teague finds no difference between the employment effects of leave
mandates on women and the employment effects of such mandates on the
labor force as a whole,189 again suggesting the difficulty of getting robust
results in this area.)
A further subtlety in discerning the effects of the FMLA is that, as Wald-
fogel emphasizes, this mandate may have a sort of composition effect, mov-
ing women into, or keeping them in, better, higher-level jobs.190 The analytic
framework developed in Part I focuses on individual employment markets,
and the implicit assumption in the empirical application of the framework is
that the overall labor market is an aggregation of individual employment
markets, in each (or many) of which similar effects are observed. But if
women move out of some employment markets and into others in response
to the FMLA, the aggregate effects may be more mixed and more complex.
3. Normative ramifications (briefly).
Both the predictions and the evidence are somewhat less unambiguous in
the context of the FMLA than in the context of the ADA and the state law
mandates governing health insurance plans. However, to the extent that the
FMLA's mandates accommodating female workers tend to be largely or
fully borne by these workers in the form of reduced wages, the normative
ramifications are very similar to those discussed in Part II.B.3 above on state
law mandates governing health insurance plans. Of special note in the
FMLA context, however, is the fact that the subsidy alternative has been
187. See Klerman & Leibowitz, supra note 179, at 79.
188. For a description of the history of the European programs, see Ruhm, Parental Leave
Mandates, supra note 9, at 290-91.
189. See Christopher J. Ruhm & Jackqueline L. Teague, Parental Leave Policies in Europe
and North America, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 55, at 133,
146-47.
190. See Waldfogel, supra note 9, at 296; Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the "Family Gap"
in Pay for Women with Children, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1998, at 137, 150-52; see also Eileen
Trzcinski, Separate Versus Equal Treatment Approaches to Parental Leave: Theoretical Issues and
Empirical Evidence, 13 LAW & POL'Y 1, 10-11 (1991) (offering a similar argument).
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sketched out in some detail in the existing literature.191 As above, a central
question about this sort of approach is the degree to which it is similar to or
different from subsidy schemes advocated as alternatives to traditional pro-
hibitions on race and sex discrimination, which are often regarded as prob-
lematic.192
CONCLUSION
Mandates directed to workers as a whole and antidiscrimination law are
old and well-developed topics. Accommodation mandates provide newer
and less well explored terrain. The present inquiry has used some of what
we know about the two more familiar topics to clear up the confusion that
exists about the less familiar one. The framework for accommodation man-
dates offered here provides a systematic way to understand the effects of
these mandates. It also generates testable predictions about these effects-
predictions that are largely confirmed by the empirical evidence.
Because accommodation mandates are for many advocates rooted in
claims of rights rather than economics, it may upon first glance seem unnatu-
ral to examine them within the type of framework I have used here. But be-
cause these mandates impose costs on employers, and because they operate
against the backdrop of employment markets in which employers may re-
main largely free to adjust wage and employment levels in response to such
costs, it is critical to examine these laws from an economic perspective. In-
deed, a failure to do so leaves one vulnerable to the arguments of opponents
of such laws (often economists or economically oriented commentators) that
the laws will tend to harm their intended beneficiaries-an argument that the
foregoing analysis has shown to be at least potentially less valid in the con-
text of accommodation mandates, which operate against the backdrop of an-
tidiscrimination law, than in the context of mandates directed to workers as a
whole.
191. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 2214-20.
192. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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Appendix
This Appendix contains formal proofs of the claims in Part I.B of the text
that cannot be rigorously established with purely verbal and graphical rea-
soning. It also presents some of the analysis from the text in a more formal
way.
The discussion makes use of some notation. Let Ed denote the employ-
ment level of disadvantaged workers; Wd the wage level of this group; En the
employment level of nondisadvantaged workers; Wn the wage level of non-
disadvantaged workers; C (> 0) the cost of a mandated accommodation; and
V the value of a mandated accommodation. (These concepts are defined in
the text.) Also let MRPL be the "physical" marginal revenue product of la-
bor, a decreasing function of the total level of employment; Sd the labor sup-
ply of disadvantaged workers, a nondecreasing function of the wage earned
by these workers; Sn the labor supply of nondisadvantaged workers, a nonde-
creasing function of the wage earned by them; Dd the labor demand for dis-
advantaged workers; and Dn the labor demand for nondisadvantaged work-
ers. Finally, let G (> 0) be the incremental per-worker-hour cost of disad-
vantaged workers to employers wholly apart from any mandated accommo-
dation; this cost could result from discrimination against these workers or
from lower average productivity of this group.
Prior to the imposition of an accommodation mandate, the wages earned
by disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers will be given by the fol-
lowing equations:
Wd = MRPL(Ed + E) - G; (Al)
Wn- MRPL(Ed + En). (A2)
Note that this formulation assumes, for G > 0, that binding restrictions on
wage differentials between disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged workers do
not predate the imposition of an accommodation mandate. In other words,
prior to the imposition of the mandate, employers are not restricted from
paying the two types of workers different wages, even if this is no longer true
after the mandate is imposed. Of course, if G = 0, so that disadvantaged and
nondisadvantaged workers are equally attractive to employers apart from the
cost of a mandated accommodation, then it is irrelevant whether there are
restrictions on wage differentials prior to the imposition of the mandate, as
workers will be paid the same either way.
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The labor supply curves for the two groups of workers prior to the impo-
sition of an accommodation mandate are given by the following equations:
Ed = Sd(Wd); (A3)
En = S,(W,). (A4)
The system comprised of the four equations in (Al) to (A4) contains four
unknowns. Let (Wd*, Wn°, Ed', En) denote a solution to the system. I as-
sume an interior solution: Ed* > 0 and En' > 0.
After the imposition of an accommodation mandate, the labor supply
curves for the two groups of workers are given by
Ed = Sd(Wd + V); (A5)
= Sn(Wn). (A6)
The labor demand curves after the imposition of the mandate will depend on
the degree to which restrictions on wage and employment differentials are
binding. The following analysis first examines the case in which both sets of
restrictions are binding and then the case in which restrictions on wage dif-
ferentials are not binding (and restrictions on employment differentials are or
are not binding).
Restrictions on Wage and Employment Differentials Are Binding
With binding restrictions on wage differentials, the two groups of work-
ers must receive a common wage after the imposition of an accommodation
mandate. This common wage, which will be denoted by W, is given by the
total marginal revenue product of labor across the disadvantaged and nondis-
advantaged workers in the employment market in question, where the total
marginal revenue product for each group of workers is given by the "physi-
cal" marginal revenue product of labor, or marginal revenue product from
production, minus the cost of the accommodation:
W = [Ed/(Ed + E)][MRPL(Ed + En) - G - C] + [E/(Ed + En)]MRPL(Ed + En).
Rewriting:
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W = MRPL(Ed + En) - [Ed/(Ed + En)](G + C). (A7)
The equation in (A7), together with the labor supply equations in (A5) and
(A6), yields a system of three equations in three unknowns. Let (W*, Ed*,
En*) denote a solution to this system.
The remainder of this discussion explains why the curve Dd' is steeper
than the curve Dd' in Figure 3 in the text and then shows that the employ-
ment level of nondisadvantaged workers falls with the imposition of the
mandate. Along the way it offers formal expressions for the Dd° and Dd'
curves in Figure 3.
Explanation of why Dd 'is steeper than Dd ° in Figure 3.
As explained in the text, the only difference between the curve Dd° and
the curve Dd' in Figure 3 is that the latter reflects a downward shift from the
average cost of the mandated accommodation across the disadvantaged and
nondisadvantaged workers in the employment market in question. The curve
Dd° is given by equation (Al) with E, = E*, since it is the pre-mandate labor
demand curve for disadvantaged workers at the pre-mandate equilibrium
level of nondisadvantaged employment (FO). The curve Dd' is given by this
same expression minus the average cost of the mandated accommodation
across the employment market in question:
W = MRPL(Ed + E. °) - G - [Ed/(Ed + En*)]C. (A8)
Note that both Dd° and Dd' contain the term G. For the sake of exposi-
tional simplicity, this term was not explicitly discussed in the text, which
focused on the other two terms here, the physical marginal revenue product
of labor (MRPL(Ed + En')) and the term reflecting the cost of the mandated
accommodation across the employment market in question
([Ed/(Ed + E*)]C). But since G is simply a constant in both the Dd° curve
and the Dd' curve, it has no effect on the analysis.
In the (Ed, W) space depicted in Figure 3, the slope of the curve Dd° is
given by the derivative of MRPL with respect to Ed (evaluated at En'), while
the slope of the curve Dd' is given by the derivative of MRPL with respect to
Ed (also evaluated at En') minus the derivative of [Ed/(Ed + En*)]C with re-
spect to Ed. The latter derivative is equal to [En*/(Ed + E*) 2]C, which is
nonnegative. It follows that Dd' is steeper than Dd° , as was sought to be
shown.
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The intuition for this result is straightforward. When Ed rises, the wage
level falls under equation (Al) for a single reason: MPL falls. By contrast,
when Ed rises, the wage level falls under equation (A8) for two reasons:
MRPL falls, and the proportion of workers for whom the cost of the man-
dated accommodation must be incurred rises.
Proof of claim that the employment level of nondisadvantaged workers falls
with an accommodation mandate (En* < En 5.
The proof of this claim is by contradiction. Suppose that En* > Eno. It
follows that W* > W_, since labor supply is nondecreasing in the wage.
W* > Wn° implies W* > Wd° , since Wn° = Wd° + G. W* > Wd° in turn im-
plies Ed* > Edo, again because labor supply is nondecreasing in the wage.
But if E,,* > F_0° and Ed* > Ed', then
MRPL(Ed* + E*) - [Ed*/(Ed* + E*)](G + C) < MRPL(Ed° + Eno),
since the marginal revenue product of labor is declining in the total level of
employment (and Ed* > 0 since Edo > 0 by assumption). So W* < Wn° (us-
ing (A2) and (A7)). This yields the desired contradiction.
Note that it follows immediately from En* < F_ ° that the post-mandate
labor demand curve for disadvantaged workers must lie above the curve Dd'
in Figure 3 in the text. As already noted, the curve Dd' is given by equation
(A8) above. Meanwhile, the post-mandate labor demand curve for disad-
vantaged workers is given by
W = MRPL(Ed + E*) - [Ed/(Ed + E*)]G - [EdI(Ed + _*)]C (A9)
(using (A7) and rewriting slightly). The first term of this expression is
greater than the first term in (A8) at any given level of Ed because En* < Eno.
The second term is also greater because -[Ed/(Ed + En*)]G > -G (as E,* > 0).
The third term is the same. It follows that the curve given by (A9) lies above
the curve given by (A8). (The exact relation of the post-mandate lahor de-
mand curve for disadvantaged workers to the curve Dd' will depend, among
other things, on how the MRPL term as a function of Ed changes with the
change from En° to E*. Note that this may vary with the level of Ed.)
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Restrictions on Wage Differentials Are Not Binding
If restrictions on wage differentials are not binding, then the following
two equations characterize the post-mandate labor demand curves for disad-
vantaged and nondisadvantaged workers (and these equations do not depend
at all on whether restrictions on employment differentials are binding):
Wd = M Ld + E)- G- C; (AlO)
W, = MRPL(Ed + E). (All)
These equations, together with the labor supply equations in (A5) and (A6),
yield a system of four equations in four unknowns. Let (Wd**, W.**, Ed**,
En**) denote a solution to this system.
Proof of claim that the employment level of nondisadvantaged workers falls
with an accommodation mandate (E,** < E. 5 if the value of the mandated
accommodation exceeds its cost and rises with an accommodation mandate
(E,** > E. 5 if the value of the mandated accommodation is less than its
cost.
Suppose to the contrary that E** > [<] En' when V > [<] C. This re-
quires W** > [<] Wn°, since labor supply is nondecreasing in the wage.
Substituting using the labor demand curves, W,** > [5] W,,° implies
MRPL(Ed** + En**) > [<] MRPL(Edo + E o). (A12)
Since En** > [<] F- °, (A12) in turn requires Ed** < [>] Ed*, which itself re-
quires Wd** + V < [>] Wd° . Since V > [<] C, it follows that
Wd** + C < [>] Wdo. But Wd** + C = Wn** - G and Wdo = Wn° - G (see
(Al), (A2), (AlO) and (Al 1)), so it must be true that W,** < [> Wn° . This
yields the desired contradiction.
Proof of claim that the employment level of nondisadvantaged workers does
not change with an accommodation mandate (E,** = E, 9 if the value of the
mandated accommodation is equal to its cost.
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Suppose to the contrary. Assume first that E** < EF_'. This requires
Wn** < Wn0 , since labor supply is a nondecreasing function of the wage.
(The fact that it is a function rather than a correspondence means that a given
wage level cannot produce two different solutions for the employment level,
so En** < En' rules out Wn** = Wn°.) If Wn** < Wn°, it follows that
Wd** + G + C < Wd0 + G (see (Al), (A2), (A10), and (All)). So
Wd** < Wd*. From Wd** < Wd ° it follows that Ed** < Ed', since labor sup-
ply is nondecreasing in the wage. But if En** < En' and Ed** < Ed', then
MRPL(Ed** + En**) > MRPL(Ed° + En°),
since the marginal revenue product of labor is declining in the total level of
employment. But this implies Wn** > Wn° , which yields the desired contra-
diction.
Assume now that E** > En'. This requires W,,** > Wn° , since labor
supply is a nondecreasing function of the wage (and is not a correspon-
dence). Substituting using the labor demand curves, W** > W,0 implies
MRPL(Ed** + En**) > MRPL(Ed° + En°).
This in turn requires Ed** < Ed° (since En** > E°). Ed** < Ed* in turn re-
quires Wd** + V < W. But by assumption V = C, so it must be true that
Wd** + C < Wd° . It follows, using (Al), (A2), (A10) and (Al 1), that
Wn** < Wn° . This yields the desired contradiction.
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